Introduction

DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH ASIA: THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND ISSUES

Kristine A. Herrmann and John M. Richardson Jr.

50 Years of Democratization in a Diverse Region

This volume examines democratization in one of the world’s most populous and diverse regions.

The subject is of intrinsic interest, but the varied experiences of South Asian nations can also help answer questions about democratization that are now engaging scholars and political leaders in other regions. Among the most important are these:

What factors best explain why some developing nations have established resilient, stable democracies, while others have not?

What are the relative importance of international and domestic causes in explaining the survival of democratic regimes and the more recent transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones?

How can leaders of democratic nations, multilateral development organizations, and non-governmental organizations support democratic transitions most effectively?

 

For those seeking answers to such questions and a deeper understanding of democratization in non-Western settings, the experiences of South Asian nations provide a wealth of material. Despite problems of violent conflict, India and Sri Lanka are two of the Third World’s most stable and resilient democracies. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, three South Asian nations long governed by authoritarian regimes, have participated in the post-Cold War "Third Wave" of democratization. Only the Maldives, a tiny island nation (not discussed in this volume) and the isolated kingdom of Bhutan have taken few steps in this direction.

Though both India and Sri Lanka have remained democratic since independence, their political institutions have evolved differently. India was dominated by a single political party and family dynasty for most of its post-independence history. India’s federal system has adapted flexibly to demands for greater regional, religious, and linguistic autonomy. In Sri Lanka, the right-leaning United National Party (UNP) has regularly alternated in power with coalitions led by the left-leaning Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Unfortunately, this high level of democratic competition appears to have impeded rather than helped to resolve problems of ethnic nationalism.

The number of influential leadership posts held by women is a distinctive phenomenon in South Asian democratic politics. Sirima Bandaranaike led her Sri Lanka Freedom Party to a general election victory in 1960, becoming the modern era’s first female head of government. She won a second term in 1970 and is the current office-holder. Her daughter, Chandrika Kumaratunga, also served as Prime Minister and is now Sri Lanka’s Executive President. Indira Gandhi succeeded her father as India’s Prime Minister in 1966 and served continuously, except for three years out of power, until she died at the hands of her Sikh bodyguards in 1984. Benazir Bhutto, daughter of executed Prime Minister Zulficar Ali Bhutto, has served twice as Pakistan’s Prime Minister. In Bangladesh, two of the three major political parties are led by women, the Bangladesh National Party by Begum Khalida Zia and the Awami League by Sheikh Hasina. Both are close relatives of former Prime Ministers and both have held that office in their own right. Vidyamali Samarasinghe reports, however, that the successes of these path-breaking political leaders have had little impact on traditional views about women’s subservient roles. Most South Asian women are still "Hanging in at the Margin."

A variety of economic development strategies have been tried in South Asia with mixed results, though all South Asian nations have lagged behind the "East Asian tigers" in economic growth. After independence, India quickly embarked on a dirigiste economic strategy, emphasizing import substitution, industrialization, and central planning. Shortcomings of this strategy became apparent in the mid-1980s and Rajiv Gandhi’s government began to confront the political obstacles to structural adjustment seriously. By 1991, in a politically turbulent environment, a full-fledged program of economic reform had been initiated, with some promising results. In Sri Lanka, the frequent changes in government have almost invariably been followed by changes in development strategy. An initial mixed economy approach, combined with high social welfare expenditures, was transformed by a succession of left-leaning governments into one of the most state controlled economies in Asia. Then in 1977, J.R. Jayewardene’s newly elected government embarked on a path of privatization, structural adjustment, and export-led growth, coupled with massive infrastructure development. Military governments in Pakistan and Bangladesh combined populist rhetoric with a "corporatist" model. Senior officers and favored business leaders cooperated on economic development tasks, often realizing substantial financial gains for themselves. Failures of this system to produce strong economic growth and diffuse benefits to their societies helped opposition forces to effect the transition from authoritarian to more democratic governance.

At a time when the relationship between governance and religion is a matter of global concern, the religious diversity of South Asian nations is of interest . India, with a predominantly Hindu population but a large Muslim minority, has continued to follow the secularist principles established at the time of independence. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, too, established secular governments at independence, but moved away from secularism later. Pakistan gained independence as an Islamic state and has retained that orientation; government support for more fundamentalist tenets of Islam has waxed and waned under different regimes. Both Nepal and Bhutan have state religions which have long been closely linked with these nations’ monarchies and legal systems: Hinduism in the case of Nepal and the Kagyupa sect of Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism in Bhutan.

South Asia offers a variety of models, successful and unsuccessful, for managing ethnic diversity. As already noted, India grants considerable regional autonomy under a federal constitution. While the 16th Amendment to India’s constitution banned advocacy of secession, new states have been created and regional official languages have been allowed. Tamil Nadu state has provided a reasonably successful model for devolving power to culturally distinct regions populated by ethnic groups with nationalist aspirations. Indian governments have been less successful in containing secessionist pressures in Kashmir and separatist pressures in Punjab. In these states, regional politics are complicated by lengthy borders with Pakistan. Pakistan’s leaders faced ethnic tensions between its Punjabi-dominated Western Provinces and Bengali-dominated East Pakistan almost from the time of independence. Whether any governance system could have held these geographically separate and culturally distinct regions together is debatable. The repressive policies adopted by a succession of Punjabi-dominated military governments were manifestly unsuccessful in doing so, though in the end Indian military intervention played a decisive role in establishing the independent state of Bangladesh. Pakistan and Bangladesh have faced numerous political and economic problems since 1970, but have been relatively free of ethnic strife.

The same cannot be said of Sri Lanka, where democratic competition between its two major political parties, both Sinhalese dominated, appears to have intensified ethnic divisions. A succession of government policies and constitutional reforms established Sinhala as Sri Lanka’s official language, granted privileged status to Buddhism, and gave preferential treatment to Sinhalese seeking government employment. Attempts to grant concessions to an increasingly restive Tamil community were successfully blocked by the party not in power. These policies catalyzed separatist sentiments in the island nation’s Northern and Eastern provinces. Inept government handing of anti-Tamil rioting in 1983, coupled with covert Indian support for Tamil militants, escalated the conflict from sporadic terrorist attacks to a full-fledged civil war, which remains unresolved. Despite hostilities, however, Sri Lanka has continued to hold competitive elections, implement development programs, and include Tamils in the nation’s political life.

Bhutan, examined in Partha Ghosh’s contribution to this volume, is the other South Asian nation struggling with ethnic nationalism. The conflict is between the majority Drukpas and the minority Lhotsampas. Buddhist Drukpas dominate the government, and the Drukpa population, whose members mostly follow centuries-old Bhutanese traditions, are strong supporters of the monarchy. The Lhotsampas, ethnic Nepalese who follow the Hindu faith, are concentrated in the southern part of the kingdom. Lately, members of the Lhotsampa community have been agitating for democratic governance, including the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. These proposals are strongly opposed not only by the government but by the majority Drukpa community. In part, the Lhotsampas have been motivated by democratic reforms in Nepal. Reports of terrorist incidents in the South and political agitation by Nepali communities living in India have grown. The government has responded with repressive measures and the imposition of a national code of conduct. Without Indian support for the opposition groups, however, it appears unlikely they will make much headway.

India’s role in South Asia provides an opportunity to examine the role of a democratic state that is also a dominant regional hegemon and has great power pretensions. India’s population, economy, and territory dwarf those of other South Asian nations. It is one of the world’s five acknowledged nuclear powers and possesses the world’s fourth largest army. Recent scholarly studies emphasizing the relatively pacific nature of democratic states have attracted wide attention. However, considerations of power politics appear to have been far more influential in shaping India’s foreign policy. The "world’s largest democracy" has fought a war with China and two wars with Pakistan, one of which lead to Bangladesh’s independence. Indian governments have not hesitated to impose their will on smaller neighbor states, where matters of national interest were at stake. This predisposition has been most evident in India’s relations with Sri Lanka. Worthy of note have been the covert training of Tamil militants on Indian soil, the "Peace Accord" imposed by Rajiv Gandhi’s government on Sri Lanka, and the ill-fated mission of India’s "Peace Keeping Force" to subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern provinces

South Asia’s experiences with democratization are examined in this volume from a theoretical perspective, through case studies of individual nations, and through more issue-oriented essays. While each chapter was written by different authors, the editors’ goal was to achieve a unity that is sometimes lacking in edited volumes. What might be termed a "matrix organization" is designed to do this. Theoretical chapters by Kenneth Kusterer and Laurence Whitehead provide a frame of reference and identify overarching themes for the five case studies that follow. Chapters on gender roles, human rights, and regional cooperation are intended to highlight issues that are common to the democratization experience in all of the South Asian nations, though they have played out somewhat differently in each. The concluding chapter returns to a broader theoretical perspective, attempting to generalize beyond South Asia and look to the future.

The more detailed introduction to individual chapters, which follows, touches on some high points in the mosaic of theory, overarching issues, and nuanced examination of national democratization experiences that this volume presents.

Part I. Definitions and Hypotheses

Defining Democratization, Encouraging it, and Measuring its Progress

Part I introduces conceptual and theoretical dimensions of democratization. In the first chapter, "On Democratization: What is it, How is it Encouraged, and How is its Progress Measured," Kenneth Kusterer argues that although the rich northern tradition of democratic thought is culturally biased, discussions of democratization in South Asia can be enriched by a comparative examination of contemporary schools of thought. First, he clarifies the central concepts of freedom and democracy.

Freedom is something an individual enjoys; it is the absence of oppression from both government and other agencies. Northern democratic traditions emphasize three inalienable freedoms: rights to personal security, personal expression, and political participation. More recently, economic and social rights have been included under the umbrella of freedom in many nations, but not the United States. Disadvantaged groups within society, such as women or minorities, are often denied freedoms given to others. Therefore, to measure a society’s freedom two dimensions must be addressed: the range of rights the most free segments of society enjoy; and what proportion of the population comprises these most free segments.

Democracy refers to a system of government rather than to individuals. It is based on three elements -- competitively selected leaders, public decision-making, and popular participation. A democratic political system includes the entire social process of political decision-making, from government agencies to citizens’ groups; it includes both government and society. Measurements of democracy typically focus on institutions rather than individuals, however the two are inextricably linked. Individual freedoms are necessary to sustain democratic institutions. Democratic institutions are more likely to protect individual freedoms.

What are the causes and sources of democratization? Kusterer identifies three contending schools of thought. He begins with the view of the 1950s and 1960s that "democratization has prerequisites" including an effective system of law enforcement, a robust middle class, and a developed civil society. Next he outlines the "democratization as a higher human need" approach of the 1960s-1980s. This school argues that because democratization and freedom are higher order needs, basic economic and security needs must be met first. Finally Kusterer explains the "democracy as a learned practice" school, which has gained popularity in the 1990s. This school hypothesizes that democratization is a process of movement along a learning curve. Accordingly, democracy can be spread through contact with democratic systems and through the exercise of political will to supply needed missing elements.

Kusterer points out that each of these approaches to democratization has strategic implications for those seeking to promote democracy. Those that believe democracy has prerequisites place emphasis on institution building. Democratizers who assume that democracy is a higher human need stress economic development and training in conflict resolution. Those who see democracy as a learned practice emphasize training in formal processes of democracy. Kusterer concludes by emphasizing the need for internationally legitimated measures to assess the progress of democratization. Until such measures are developed, he believes that international pressures for democratization and liberalization will be less effective.

Facilitating Democratization: The International Dimension

How does the international system generate pressures that facilitate democratization? This is the question Laurence Whitehead addresses in his chapter on "The International Dimension of Democratization: Three Perspectives." Whitehead labels his three perspectives "contagion," "control", and "consent." He argues that these alternative hypotheses about democratic transitions should be judged by their capacity to illuminate particular historical experiences, taking into account the contingency, ambiguity, and reversibility of the democratization process.

Contagion is the most parsimonious concept. It presumes "neutral" transmission mechanisms that cause countries bordering on democracies to replicate democratic political institutions. While the contagion hypothesis cannot tell us how a sequence begins or why it ends, it does account for some striking regularities. The Control perspective takes into consideration the roles played by external actors in imposing a democratic form of government on another country. From this perspective, democratization might be seen as an "anti-Communist vaccine" promoted by Western leaders in the post-World War II era. Whitehead points out that nearly two-thirds of existing democracies came about through acts of either internal or external imposition. Consent, the third perspective, has the greatest relevance in South Asia. This perspective considers more variables and distinguishes between different phases, alternative paths, and outcomes. It also raises the relative importance of domestic vis a vis international factors as an issue. Whitehead concludes by stressing that a bifurcation of democratization studies into "domestic" and "international" categories is artificial. Most cases contain elements of both.

 

Part II. The South Asian Experience

1. India: Contradictions and Consequences

   Part II presents six country-specific case studies of democratization in practice, spanning the entire post-World War II era. Chapter 3 examines India, which is both the world’s largest democracy and South Asia’s dominant power. S.N. Jha’s contribution examines interrelationships between democratization and economic development, giving particular attention to recent economic reform initiatives. He argues that a state-centered approach to understanding India is most useful since, like many Third World governments, India’s has played the dominant role in transforming and directing the economy. His examination of pre- and post-independence state formation in India focuses on who has controlled government policies and who has benefited from them.

   Democratization in India, Jha observes, has not been an unalloyed success story. Dirigiste economic and social policies have created inefficiencies and inequalities. These, in turn, have adversely affected the state’s capacity to govern. Nor is Jha enthusiastic about current liberalization policies. New economic reforms are drastic and will have far-reaching impacts, many of them irreversible. He wonders whether the free market model is capable of addressing India’s high poverty levels and regional imbalances. Privatization and disinvestment in the public sector will probably intensify unemployment and widen the gap between rich and poor. These impacts will intensify demands for an increased state role. Democratically elected politicians will find it difficult to resist such demands. On the other hand, government institutions may be ill equipped to play a needed regulatory role in an economy where the private sector is more aggressive, where foreign capital has relatively free entry, and where multinational corporations play an increased role. In sum, Jha concludes that the free market will be no panacea for India’s problems. Broad ranging administrative and political reforms will be needed as well, but Jha wonders whether India’s democratic institutions will be up to the test.

2. Pakistan: Electoral Politics and Democracy

   Mohammad Waseem’s case study grapples with the challenges that attempts to establish viable democratic institutions in Pakistan have faced. He wonders whether theories of democratization are relevant to Pakistan and, indeed, to any South Asian states.

   What has undermined the electoral process and other democratic institutions, Waseem asks? After independence, a small elite, comprising military officers, top civil servants and landowners adapted colonial structures of privilege to remain in power. Governance was viewed as an administrative process, rather than a political one. Political parties were viewed as destabilizing by the dominant bureaucratic-military elite and their power was limited. Self-serving, fractious behavior by politicians reinforced the elite’s biases. Increasingly, the new state’s power was exercised from outside Parliament; the role of elected representatives was marginalized.

   Waseem theorizes that strained relationships between Pakistan’s increasingly dominant military leaders and its political parties produced a politically debilitating vicious cycle. Under military governments, parties had little power and elected politicians sitting in Parliament had few functions to perform. Military leaders characterized politicians as corrupt, self-aggrandizing, and indifferent to the people’s will. Since politicians had little to do, other than play a gadfly role, this characterization became self-fulfilling. Reforms such as Ayub Khan’s basic democracies scheme were touted as a way for "the people" to express themselves politically without using politicians as intermediaries. According to Waseem, attempts to delegitimize political opposition -- to make opposition seem almost treasonous -- is not unique to Pakistan; it is ubiquitous in nascent Third World democracies.

   Elections typically serve at least two functions in a democracy, Waseem observes. They provide a vehicle for popular participation, including participation in the transfer of power, and they legitimize governments that emerge victorious at the polls. Pakistan’s military governments, however, tried to amputate the participatory function from elections. The result was a crippled electoral institution and, indeed, a crippled political process. Waseem’s historical survey shows that elections did retain a residual legitimacy. Military governments were never able to entirely abandon the elective principle. But elections, often rigged, were held to "let off steam" and confer legitimacy, not to effect a real transfer of power between contending, legitimate political forces.

   The legacy of successive failures to institutionalize meaningful democratic elections is a continuing crisis of political participation in Pakistan. Lack of parliamentary sovereignty, periodic removals of elected leaders, and intervals of martial law have contributed to ongoing doubts about the government’s legitimacy. Waseem concludes that for democracy to move forward in Pakistan, the electoral system must be immunized from manipulation by extra-parliamentary forces. It must move closer to a genuinely democratic process that enables public participation in decision making at all levels. Recent trends provide hopeful, albeit uncertain portents.

3. Bangladesh: Democratization in Crisis

   The weakness of Pakistan’s democratic institutions, coupled with ethnic discrimination, contributed to East Pakistan’s ultimately successful fight for independence. Bangladesh’s turbulent experiences with democratization following independence are the focus of Abdul Momin Chawdury and Chandra Barman’s contribution.

   The authors’ first relate how repression by Pakistan’s Punjabi-dominated government fueled political mobilization in East Pakistan. In contrast to Pakistan’s western provinces, East Pakistan’s Bengali population was not only mobilized, but represented by a strong political party, the Awami League. Second they examine the failure of democratic institutions to take root in newly-independent Bangladesh.

   The new Bengali state did not begin its life as a parliamentary democracy under propitious circumstances. Its population was poor and its economic infrastructure weak. Despite the Awami League’s successes, Bangladesh inherited many of Pakistan’s political pathologies: residual colonialist structures, fractious politicians, intolerance of opposition and senior military officers for whom political meddling was a tradition.

   Bangladesh’s first general election, in 1973, highlighted many of these pathologies. Though the Awami League was overwhelmingly favored, party leaders attempted to emasculate opposition forces by stifling political debate and rigging the election. This crippled the new democracy’s growth at a fragile stage of evolution. Once in power, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government faced inevitable popular dissatisfaction as it tried to grapple with nearly intractable problems. The "father" of independent Bangladesh, once a committed democrat, responded to this dissatisfaction with increasingly authoritarian measures. Retaining power, rather than nurturing democracy, appeared to be his overriding concern .

   Sheikh Mujibur’s assassination in 1975 precipitated a chain of events that ended Bangladesh’s experiment with democracy for more than 15 years. The coup that brought General Zia-ur-Rahman to power, ending a turbulent interregnum, initiated a pattern of authoritarian rule and non-democratic transfers of power. Since Zia had gained power by questionable means, he tried to legitimize his position, using manipulated referenda and elections. This increased public skepticism about any electoral outcome. Like his counterparts in Pakistan, Zia successfully consolidated power but could not institutionalize stable, regularized political processes. Increasingly, he relied on the military, buttressed by appeals to Islamic values, to support his regime. When Zia, too, died at the hands of an assassin, the pattern of a turbulent interregnum, followed by a military coup was repeated.

   Chawdury and Barman describe the fruitless attempts of Zia’s successor, General H.M. Ershad, to cloak his authoritarian government in the symbols of democratic legitimacy. He was able to hold power for eight years, but an increasingly vigorous opposition led by Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khalida Zia would not be silenced. Faced with popular demonstrations that brought the country to a standstill together with growing international pressures, General Ershad was forced to resign. This was Bangladesh’s first transfer of power through non-military means. The goal of the transitional caretaker government was to hold free and fair elections, restore order, and establish the rule of law. When Begum Khalida Zia became President, following her party’s general election victory, the first of these goals had been attained.

   Our authors’ prognosis for the success of democratization in Bangladesh is similar in many respects to Waseem’s prognosis for Pakistan. Democratic institutions are still very fragile, they conclude. In a society with authoritarian traditions and habits, giving these institutions solid roots is likely to be an uphill battle. On the other hand, resisting authoritarian rule is also a tradition in Bangladesh. In this respect it differs from its Islamic neighbor to the West. A mobilized populace played a pivotal role in gaining independence and toppling General Ershad’s government. Bangladesh does have strong political parties, but lacks traditions of non-confrontational political debate and of using democratic institutions -- elections and parliament -- to build consensus. Developing such traditions, while implementing more effective development policies, are the next challenges.

4. Sri Lanka: The Resilience of Democracy

   K.M. de Silva’s contribution describes how another South Asian nation, Sri Lanka, has met these challenges. His subtitle, The Resilience of Democracy, seems appropriate for a nation where threats faced by democratic institutions seem unusually daunting. They have included a draining ethnic civil war, a second civil war instigated by radical Sinhalese militants, and Indian military intervention.

   What explains democracy’s resiliency? De Silva argues that free and fair elections became integral in Sri Lanka’s political traditions even before independence. By the mid-1950s, there were two relatively strong and well-organized political parties. Competition between these parties in periodic general elections helped legitimize the idea of peaceful, regularized transfers of power. Not every aspect of Sri Lanka’s democracy has worked perfectly, de Silva emphasizes, but the traditions of free elections, party competition, and peaceful transfers of power have remained solid.

   In 1948 Sri Lanka appeared to be among the most promising of the Third World’s newly independent nations. Its economy seemed relatively strong. The transfer of power from colonial rule had been peaceful. There was cadre of well-educated and experienced political leaders. Citizens were accustomed to a democratic form of government, albeit with colonial oversight; universal suffrage had begun in 1931. Indeed, from 1947-1956 (the immediate post-colonial period) the transplantation of western-style democratic institutions and organizations of civil society seemed successful.

   Ten years after independence, however, the democratic ideals of pluralism and secularism were challenged by populist nationalists who reasserted indigenous values emphasizing ethnic identity based on language and religion. Under the left-leaning coalition governments of S.W.R.D Bandaranaike and Sirima Bandaranaike, the civil service and military became more politicized and more predominantly Sinhalese. Affirmative action policies established Sinhala as Sri Lanka’s official language and stripped minorities of some legal rights. Sinhalese were given preferential treatment in government employment and university admissions. These policies provoked a militant separatist movement that mounted an effective terrorist campaign, further polarizing ethnic relations. Eventually ethnic conflict escalated into a full scale civil war. With India providing sanctuaries, training, and supplies to the Tamil militants, Sri Lanka’s security forces were unable to win a decisive victory.

   According to de Silva, Sri Lanka’s experience illustrates the stresses and strains a democratic system faces from prolonged periods of acute ethnic strife: economic growth is retarded; resources are diverted to the security forces; civil liberties and political rights suffer; international actors become involved; militant minority groups, in turn, discriminate against other ethnic groups in the territories they control.

   Though Sri Lanka’s democracy has been resilient, de Silva concludes, democratic institutions do not guarantee wise leadership or successful policies. Keeping the country together, ending the civil war, and normalizing ethnic relations remain major challenges for political leaders. Also, there is a need for greater internal democracy within political parties, which have been ruled autocratically by small leadership cadres. Historically, political competition in Sri Lanka has tended to widen gaps between ethnic groups rather than narrowing them. This pattern must be changed.

5. Nepal: Problems and Prospects of Democratization

   The remaining case studies examine two South Asian nations that have had the least experience with democracy -- Nepal and Bhutan. Lok Raj Baral’s contribution highlights the interplay of internal and external factors in shaping Nepal’s political institutions. The kingdom’s traditions have been monarchical, patrimonial, and hierarchical, not democratic. While political institutions had some authoritarian and oligarchic characteristics, patrimonial and feudal characteristics seemed to predominate. A centralized autocratic monarchy, governing through undifferentiated political structures, with family ties playing major roles, continued to dominate Nepal’s society and economy until the first anti-Rana movement in 1950-51. Support for this first anti-monarchy movement did not coalesce, however, and it paved the way for additional decades of royal absolutism.

   Baral points out that both internal and external factors contributed to the monarchy’s survival. Within Nepal, the bureaucracy, army and police remained staunchly loyal to the King. Nascent political parties had no popular base. Their elite leadership focused on negotiations with the King and his traditionalist supporters before building grass-roots support. When the King turned against them they were unable to defend themselves. Support from India, the United States, and the United Kingdom also helped give monarchical authoritarianism an additional lease on life in Nepal.

   When this system collapsed in the 1980s, it was because the balance of internal and external forces had shifted. Times had changed, but King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev and his traditionalist supporters had not changed with the times. The Panchayat system, a traditionalist approach to village-level political participation, had failed to deal with pressing development problems and lacked legitimacy. Rampant corruption of some top officials was weakening support even for the monarchy itself. This enabled the regime’s political opponents to become more assertive and gain a broader base of support. Externally, international human rights groups mounted increasing pressure against the regime. In a more democratic international climate, these pressures were endorsed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and donor agencies. Because Nepal’s leaders had flirted with China, India also joined the ranks of those nations supporting change.

   In 1990, King Birendra acknowledged the reality of his position and conceded gracefully to the groundswell of demands for reform. Now the support of the monarchy was given to the creation of new democratic institutions. A broad-based interim government orchestrated the transition to democracy and drafted a new constitution which limited the role of the King. Remarkably, this new system of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government has functioned with reasonable effectiveness, so far.

   In assessing prospects for democratization, Baral notes that a democratic political culture has not yet taken root in Nepal, and civil society remains weak. It remains to be seen whether the government has the capacity to govern effectively and to win legitimacy for democratic institutions over the long term. Baral also notes several positive factors. Nepali society is characterized by moderation, and reconciliation is valued. Also, respect for the monarchy remains a unifying force. Externally, the international and regional environment is pro-democratic. He concludes, however, with a note of caution: if parties are not responsible, and the government is not effective, authoritarian forces may reassert themselves.

6. Bhutan: Ethnicity, Democracy and Nation-Building

   Partha Ghosh’s contribution introduces us to Bhutan, the only South Asian nation in which democratization has made little headway. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk is both head of state and head of government. Paternalism is the predominant political ethic; kinship ties determine political affiliations. While there are some formal mechanisms of political participation, there is little real democracy. On the other hand, the King appears to be accessible, genuinely concerned about the well-being of his people, and widely popular, at least among the majority Drukpa community.

   As already noted, ethnic conflict between the Drukpas and the minority Lhotsampas, who are of Nepali origin, threatens the territorial integrity of this Himalayan nation. The conflict has become a major political issue. Drukpas are over-represented in the government, while the Lhotsampas are vastly under-represented. Conflicting images of the monarchy’s role also divide the two communities. Drukpas view the King as a member of their community and a symbol of Bhutanese nationalism. Hereditary succession, but not divine right, legitimizes his power. Lhotsampas, however, believe the King is a divine right monarch, reflecting traditional Nepalese views of kingship.

   Despite this belief, Lhotsampa politicians have attempted to mobilize their community behind a "pro-democracy" movement as a way of redressing ethnic discrimination. The government has responded with policies that equate Drukpa identity with Bhutanese nationalism. Ghosh describes several new laws that limit citizenship and impose a "traditional" dress code that have alienated and angered the minority. A small militant movement has been mobilized and some terrorist acts have been reported. There are a growing number of refugees, some of whom have fled to India and Nepal.

   Bhutan’s government treats both the pro-democracy agitation and militancy as "law and order" problems. No political solutions have been proposed. Repressive measures have aroused some international concern, including accusations of human rights abuses by a SAARC jurists’ group and Amnesty International. India would be in a strong position to exert pressure for democratic reforms in Bhutan, but has not chosen to do so. Bhutan’s economy is largely dependent on India, however Bhutan’s geostrategic position is more important to India than internal politics; it matters little to India’s leaders whether the regime is democratic or not, so long as it supports to India’s security interests.

   Ghosh’s view is that democracy may not necessarily be the best form of government for Bhutan. The King is young and progressive. He seems to understand the need for broad-based support. While the government is authoritarian, it is a form of authoritarianism that is consistent with Drukpa traditions. In contrast to Nepal, there is no groundswell of support for democratic reforms. The King seems willing to accommodate minority concerns, to some degree. Ghosh believes that the Lhotsampa leaders would gain by meeting him half-way and that a mutually beneficial agreement could be reached. Somehow, the Lhotsampas must be brought back into the political mainstream if Bhutan is to survive in its present form.

Part III. Unresolved Issues

1. Women’s Roles: "Hanging in at the Margin"

   Women’s roles in South Asian democracies, human rights, and relationships between democratization, economic liberalization, and economic cooperation are the three "unresolved issues" are that examined in Part III.

   Vidyamali Samarasinghe’s contribution calls attention to the fact that the 50 percent of South Asia’s population who happen to be women are underrepresented and marginalized in South Asian democracies, both new and old. Though equal participation in decision making is a widely accepted democratic ideal, social structures, cultural norms and historical traditions preclude equal participation. Women’s lower social position makes it difficult for them to compete on equal terms with men. Most are excluded from active roles in the political process. In fact, women account for less than 10 percent of total parliamentary representation in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

   What are the obstacles that limit women’s participation?, Samarasinghe asks. One obstacle, lack of financial resources, is shared by South Asian women and their First World counterparts. Participation in politics, especially political campaigning, is costly. South Asian men receive disproportionately higher incomes and control a disproportionate share of financial assets.

   Patriarchal social controls are more distinctively a problem in South Asian as well as other developing nations. Such controls are linked to religious beliefs, which are powerful social forces throughout South Asia. Although women played an active role in independence movements, post-independence national leaders, reacting against "western" intrusions, began "reinventing" traditions. In these reinvented traditions, women are mythologized as symbols of cultural continuity. Gendered ideologies emphasize women’s roles as child bearers, child rearers, and housekeepers. Active political participation was seen to be in conflict with these roles and hence, inconsistent with indigenous nationalist ideals.

   Women are further disadvantaged by the political violence that characterizes South Asian political campaigns and elections. Widely held gender stereotypes picture women as ill equipped to deal with this rough side of the political process. While some of these concerns are unfounded, women recognize that the threat of sexual violence is real. Fears of rape and other forms of sexual abuse discourage some women from becoming politically active.

   What strategies are women using to overcome these obstacles? Samarasinghe notes that some women simply accept patriarchal social controls, using them to protect class privileges. However others find "loopholes" in these controls and become effective, even powerful participants. One strategy is to capitalize on kinship ties and social connections, a path male politicians in South Asia have long used. Another is to become involved in non-governmental and community-based organizations. These have become training grounds for women, where they are raising their self-confidence, gaining experience, and chipping away at patriarchal social controls.

   Samarasinghe concludes there is much work to be done before women gain full political equality in South Asia. To be sure, a few South Asian women have capitalized on kinship ties and elite backgrounds to gain top posts, however they are exceptions. When it comes to exercising real political power, most South Asian women are still "hanging in at the margin."

2. Human Rights and the Neo-Liberal Raj

   Women’s rights are one aspect of the larger question of human rights, which is addressed by Stig Toft Madsen in his contribution. He identifies human rights as a major constitutent, along with capitalism and democratization, of post-Cold War socio-political transformations. These three constituents are integral to what Madsen terms the "neo-liberal formula."

   Democracy and human rights have "different points of gravity," Madsen notes. Democracy is defined from within and consolidated through the electoral process. By contrast, human rights are defined from without, largely by international treaties, and citizens have little influence in process. The neo-liberal human rights regime compels regional and local structures to define themselves by standards of international society. When such standards conflict with "national" norms and traditions, tensions result.

   Madsen develops this theme by comparing changes in the international human rights regime with changes in South Asian nations. His analysis is broad-ranging, addressing codes, structures, methodologies, and agendas. He notes that South Asian countries’ ratification record of UN human rights instruments is poor. Such universalistic neo-liberal norms conflict with non-liberal traditional norms and codes, especially Orthodox Islamic codes. A further problem is lack of consensus regarding international standards for measuring national-level human rights performance. Within South Asia, individual countries vary in their emphasis on human rights. Even in countries with some human rights protections, such as India and Sri Lanka, enforcement mechanisms are weak. International human rights organizations have often been viewed as adversaries. In the face of national policies and resistance to international intrusions, SAARC has been slow to propose steps toward regional cooperation.

   What steps could be taken to strengthen human rights protections in South Asia? Madsen sketches out a "neo-liberal agenda" that includes ratification of international instruments, cooperation with human rights monitors, police reform, renovation of judicial structures, and strengthening of human rights oriented non-governmental organizations. Programs designed to educate South Asian publics about the meaning of human rights would also be important.

   In his conclusion, however, Madsen expresses little optimism about realizing this agenda through international pressure. As the global economic center of gravity moves from the West to Southeast Asia, the leverage of Western nations and Western-controlled multilateral organizations will be weakened, he predicts. Strident nationalism and ethnic conflict will pose continuing threats to human rights. For change to occur, human rights will have to be given higher priority in the region as a whole and in individual nations. A scenario that would shift priorities in this way is difficult to envision.

Democratization, Economic Liberalization and Regional Cooperation

Conclusion: Lessons and Prospects

What lessons can be drawn from 50 years of experience with democratization in South Asia. Seeking such lessons, we return to the three questions posed at the beginning of this overview. Patterns of democratization in South Asia make it a useful arena for seeking answers. Prior to 1988, only India and Sri Lanka could be labeled democratic, while the remaining states were non-democratic. Thus this period is useful for investigating hypotheses about the causes and sources of democracy that Kenneth Kusterer discusses. Since 1988, South Asia has experienced a strong pro-democracy trend and no South Asian nation has reverted to an authoritarian regime. This coincides with the end of the Cold War and a strong pro-democracy trend internationally. Thus the post-1988 period is useful for investigating Laurence Whitehead’s hypotheses about democratic transitions.

The view that "democracy is a learned practice" appears to best explain why democracy survived in India and Sri Lanka, but not in Pakistan and Bangladesh. As already noted, this view emphasizes the importance of experience with democratic skills and practices coupled with a "will to democracy." "Practice" with democracy in a society increases the probability that democratic institutions will take root and become resilient. This is what happened in both India and Sri Lanka. India befitted from nearly two decades of stable rule by a highly regarded leader who was deeply committed to democracy. General elections were regularly held, forces of ethnic separatism and religious extremism were kept at bay, and maintenance of basic political freedoms was established as a norm. When democratic institutions faced serious challenges, following Nehru’s death, they were strong enough to survive. In Sri Lanka, the "learning process" included regularly scheduled general elections contested by competitive political parties. Voters learned that their votes could make a real difference and politicians learned that they could be held accountable. In Pakistan and Bangladesh the experience was quite different. Both civilian and military leaders subverted democratic institutions in order to protect their power, almost from the outset. The judiciary became subservient to the regime. The results of legitimate elections were annulled. Staged elections, held frequently in Bangladesh, were designed to prop up the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes.

A changed international climate appears to be pivotal in explaining the post-1988 democratic transitions in South Asia. Prior to 1988, the international climate was, if anything, anti-democratic. After 1988 there were democratization experiments in many parts of the world and Western nations, led by the United States, began to intervene actively on the side of democratic forces. Whitehead’s third and most complex model of democratization, which combines international support and domestic "consent", best explains how a changed international climate contributed to political change in Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. External pressures and demonstration effects shifted the political balance of power between pro-democratic and authoritarian forces in these nations.

How can leaders of older democracies, multilateral agencies and non-governmental agencies effectively support democratic transitions? is the third question we address. We conclude that international pressure, election monitoring, and other forms of technical assistance can be helpful where pro-democracy forces already have some strength. Supporting a more impartial and competent judicial system, where there is a predisposition for judicial reform, can also make a difference. International business leaders may support democratic transitions by opposing authoritarian excesses and supporting regimes that favor transparency, judicial independence, and the rule of law.

World leaders should also be aware that international activism has its limits. It is unlikely to make a difference in nations that attach little value to democratic traditions. Nor can it ensure the establishment of regimes that are stable and effective. Developing resilient democratic institutions in South Asia is likely to be a lengthy, turbulent, and uncertain process.