John M. Richardson Jr. and Shinjinee Sen 2
School of International Service, American University
March 24, 1996
Ethnic
Conflict and Economic Development:
A POLICY ORIENTED ANALYSIS 1
John
M. Richardson Jr. and Shinjinee Sen 2
School of International Service, American University
March 24, 1996
Historical Legacies of Mistrust
"Victim" Mentality"
Relative Deprivation
Leadership Roles
Political Mobilization and the Formation of Militant Groups
Making Ethnic Conflict Management an Economic Policy Goal
Co-optation of Subordinate Group Leaders
Devolution of Power
Adopting more conciliatory leadership styles
Introduction
This paper asks: how can economic
development in Global South nations can be better managed, so as
to reduce the potential for violent ethnic conflict? To
answer this we must pose a prior question: why is economic
development so often accompanied by violent ethnic conflict?
Viewing economic development
and ethnic conflict as linked problems requires reassessment of
two widely accepted schools of thought about the relationship
between these phenomena. One school, prevalent in the 1950s and
1960s held that economic development would inevitably reduce the
potential for violent conflict, since growth would be rapid and
the resulting benefits diffused through all levels of society.
Proponents included both mainstream and Marxist development
scholars 3. The first decade or so of post colonial
independence seemed to confirm this theory, but in the late
1960s, rising ethnic tensions in many new nations, and full-blown
ethnic civil wars in some, raised doubts.
A second and more persistent school held that economic
development policies and those relevant to "maintaining
political stability" could be formulated in separate
compartments. World Bank staff members were major proponents.
Their views reflected graduate training in economics, plus a
charter specifying governments as the Bank's clients and
proscribing "political" involvement. It was not until
the 1980s that senior Bank officials began to take an increased
interest in public administration -- an area they attempted to
de-politicize by labeling it "governance." 4
Political changes from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s
proved both views wrong. Even in developing nations that did well
economically, economic benefits did not diffuse to all segments
of society or all regions. This lead some ethnically diverse
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka to implement
preferential policies that benefited some groups or regions
disproportionately. Disagreements over the fruits of development
made the accommodations necessary to sustain political order more
difficult and contributed to outbreaks of violent conflict.
Increasingly, policy-makers are acknowledging that economic
development and conflict management policies cannot be separated 5. A small but growing body of literature focuses on
social and political side-effects of economic development
programs 6. However conflict management, especially in
ethnically diverse societies, has not yet assumed its proper role
in development planning. For the scope of development planning to
be broadened in this way, the causes of ethnic conflict and how
some development strategies can exacerbate ethnic tensions
leading to conflict must be better understood.
What Causes Ethnic Conflict?
Violent conflict between rival ethnic
groups sometimes breaks out spontaneously, but "ethnic
conflict" is mostly a struggle between rival organizations
seeking to maintain or gain control of state power. To understand
ethnic conflict, we must understand the role ethnicity plays in
mobilizing, structuring, and managing such organizations 7. Further, we must understand how leaders use
ethnically divisive strategies to mobilize political support.
Proximate causes of ethnic conflicts can be easily identified 8. In typical scenarios, leaders of a dominant ethnic
group gain office and then use state institutions to distribute
economic and political benefits preferentially to their ethnic
brethren. Discrimination against subordinate group members, often
portrayed as less deserving human beings, accompanies this
preferential treatment. When force is needed to impose
discriminatory practices and quell subordinate group resistance,
it is exercised by police officers and soldiers recruited almost
exclusively from the dominant group, who often view themselves as
"ethnic soldiers" 9 In democratic
societies, a dominant group that is a majority often uses its
voting power to entrench discriminatory practices by legal or
quasi legal means. When a dominant group is the minority, it
typically imposes discriminatory policies by force although, as
in South Africa, cosmetic democratic institutions may legitimize
discrimination. Democracy alone cannot ensure ethnic harmony.
Instead, it may allow freer expression of ethnic antagonisms and
legalized persecution of minorities.
Subordinate group members may endure discrimination for an
extended period of time; however a sense of shared deprivation
strengthens identification with their group, providing a basis
for political mobilization along ethnic lines. Before inter-group
relations polarize, "moderate" subordinate group
leaders often seek a modus vivendi with their dominant group
counterparts. In some nations, notably Malaysia, leaders have
been able to work out a relatively stable accommodation,
involving trade offs between political and economic power. More
typically pleas of subordinate group leaders for accommodation
are ignored or judged to be "politically infeasible" by
dominant group leaders. The more severe and inflexible the
discrimination, the more probable that subordinate group members
will become radicalized. As radicalization proceeds, subordinate
group members shift support from moderate to militant leaders.
Militant leaders form disciplined paramilitary organizations
committed to violent force as the only feasible strategy for
ending discrimination.
An escalating spiral of violent political conflict, ethnic
polarization, social disintegration and economic decline is the
most probable outcome. This scenario has been all too prevalent
in developing nations and now in former Communist nations. Ethnic
conflicts, once they become violent, are exceedingly difficult to
resolve 10. Indeed, some observers
argue that separating protagonists physically is the only
practicable solution 11. Since members of dominant
and subordinate groups are often economically interdependent and
physically intermingled, however, this "solution" may
be impossible or only slightly less tragic than protracted
conflict.
It is easy to see why subordinate group members who experience
discrimination would use ethnicity as a basis for political
mobilization and eventually turn to militant leaders who argue
that "we have no choice" but violence. However,
protracted ethnic conflict is, more often than not, a negative
sum game in which both dominant and subordinate groups lose.
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Rwanda,
Ethiopia and the Punjab are just a few recent examples of
conflicts where the long-term costs of discriminatory policies to
almost all involved far outweighed any conceivable benefits 12. In view of this history,
why do dominant group leaders choose to implement discriminatory
practices in the first place. Also, why they so often
underestimate the probability of a violent subordinate group
response, and their capacity to deal with it. This paper contends
that typical development policies and the process of development,
as they unfold in many developing nations, contribute to such
miscalculations.
A supportive climate for this cycle of discrimination and
militant response is provided by long standing beliefs and
attitudes, held by many ethnic group members in multi-ethnic
nations. Most important among these are historical legacies of
mistrust, a mentality of victimization, and feelings of shared
deprivation. They make group members more receptive to simplistic
appeals from extremist leaders and encourage leaders to make such
appeals. A myopic view of rival groups and over-optimism about
the efficacy of state power may create a "social trap"
that, particularly in times of economic stress, tempts leaders to
implement discriminatory policies without fully assessing the
consequences 13. The role of long standing
beliefs and attitudes in multi-ethnic societies and the role
leaders play in exploiting them need to be examined more fully.
Historical
Legacies of Mistrust
Some years ago, one of this paper's authors
(Richardson) spent an evening at the home of a colleague whom,
for purposes of this recounting, we shall call "Amal".
Amal is a sophisticated, multilingual, manager who holds a high
position in an international organization. In more than five
years of an infrequent but close professional and personal
friendship, we had hardly ever discussed his ethnicity. This
unusually convivial evening was to be different. There was a fine
meal, many glasses of wine, and several hours of conversation,
lasting until near midnight. Amal's wife had left us and we, too,
began to think of retiring. As we were about to separate, Amal
beckoned: "I want to show you something," he said. He
lead me to a small room in the rear of his house, entirely
decorated in red. On one wall, was a map showing the
"greater nation" of his ethnic group. Crimson splashes
marked locations where, in the process of driving them from their
"homeland" more than fifty years before, the armies of
a rival group had massacred thousands of Amal's ethnic brethren.
With great emotion, he related the story of those massacres and
subsequent diaspora of his family. "Every day I bring my
[three year old] son to this room and show him this map,"
Amal concluded in a choked voice," so that he will never
forget what they did to us."
"Recollections" such as this are a part of every ethnic
conflict. In the Middle East, ethnic differences are traced to
biblical times and to the Christian crusades as well as to the
Post World War II era. In Northern Ireland, historic clashes
between Protestants and Catholics are relived in annual festivals
that often become violent. Sri Lankan school children are told of
the Buddha's pledge that Lanka would be a special haven for
Buddhism and reminded of the pivotal clash between Sinhalese
Prince Dutugemunu and Tamil King Elaric that reestablished
Buddhist-Sinhalese dominance on the island 14. For Serbians
and Croatians, the incursions into Europe of Ottoman Sultans are
a living reality, along with the ethnically divisive policies of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and atrocities instigated by ethnic
based regimes and in partisan conflicts during World War II 15.
These historical legacies of mistrust and hatred are not
genetically transmitted from one generation to another. Rather,
they become a vivid part of current reality through myth,
socialization and education. Control of the media, educational
institutions and religious instruction facilitates propagation of
such legacies, but word of mouth propagation persists even in the
face of oppression. While ethnic groups that control state power
have a clear advantage in promoting their world view, rival
groups fight to maintain control over the socialization of their
members. The survival of ethnic nationalism in the face of Soviet
repression illustrates the tenacity with which ethnic groups
cling to their identities.
"Victim"
Mentality
Members and leaders of
contending ethnic groups, whether they are presently
discriminating against a subordinate group or the object of
discrimination, often portray themselves as victims. A
"victim" mentality helps unite group members behind
their leaders. and justifies present sacrifices. Moreover.
members of a victimized group feel justified in victimizing
others --being a victim in the past, real or imagined, thus does
not ensure humane treatment of rival ethnic groups in the
present. Ethnic leaders seek control of state power to ensure
their group is never victimized again, to right past wrongs and
to avenge past oppression. Two examples - South Africa and Sri
Lanka - illustrate this.
In South Africa, white Afrikaners, who were descended from Dutch
and French settlers, viewed themselves as victims of British
colonialism, even while using Apartheid laws to oppress black
South Africans. The Great Trek and the Boer War were potent
historical symbols which fuelled this sense of victimization.
Afrikaners were God's chosen people, redeemed by suffering, and
destined to rule over the inferior Blacks, Indians and Coloreds
(mixed-race people) 16.
Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority
also viewed themselves as victims. They resented the favorable
treatment given to Tamils under colonial rule and by conservative
post-independence governments. They felt discriminated against by
government language policies that placed their language, Sinhala,
in an inferior position and made it difficult for them to
communicate with public officials. They feared the Tamils would
make common cause with their ethnic brethren in South India's
populous Tamil Nadu State. Throughout Sri Lanka's ancient
history, Tamil invasions had been either a threat or a reality.
In the words of historian K.M. de Silva, the Sinhalese were a
"majority group with a minority complex" 17. This
attitude fueled political support for Sinhalese nationalist
leaders such as S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Bandaranaike and
J.R. Jayewardene whose policies convinced many Tamils there was
no alternative to secession 18.
Relative
Deprivation
That their oppressors may have been victims in
the past, does little to mitigate the resentment of ethnic group
members who are currently being oppressed. In the jargon used by
conflict theorist Ted R. Gurr, they are experiencing relative
deprivation, a perception that the circumstances of their lives
are not providing benefits to which they are justly entitled 19. Feelings of
relative deprivation intensify, not only when benefits (including
political, religious and language rights, as well as economic
well being) decline, but also when expectations increase. When
large numbers of an ethnic group experience relative deprivation
simultaneously, the potential for spontaneous outbreaks of
violence, directed at rival groups, intensifies. Historical
legacies of mistrust and a victim mentality make it more likely
that feelings of deprivation resulting from declining benefits or
unrealized expectations will be interpreted as an ethnically
motivated injustice.
Contributing to deprivation is the fact that reestablishing a
more equitable social order, following a period of
discrimination, is more often a zero sum rather than a positive
sum game. Sri Lanka's pro Sinhalese governments were committed to
scaling down the disproportionate role played by Tamils in the
nation's government and economic life. Tamils viewed this as a
loss of rights to which they were entitled. Leaders of the
Punjab's Akali Dal movement were committed to greater Sikh
self-determination, within the framework of India's federal
system. Punjabi Hindus, who stood to be the losers, viewed this
as going "too far" 20. The United Kingdom
government would like to defuse the power of the Irish Republican
Army by making concessions to Northern Ireland's Catholic
population. Those concessions are viewed as a loss of
historically mandated rights by Protestant loyalists.
Leadership
Roles
Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Clerk in South
Africa have shown how courageous leadership can sometimes reduce
ethnic tensions. More often, political and religious leaders play
a divisive role, appealing to ethnic-nationalist sentiments and
scape-goating rival groups in order to enhance personal political
power and, in democratic societies, to win political office.
"Ethnic-bashing," as this leadership strategy is
sometimes labeled, serves to reinforce in-group identity, by
emphasizing
the common ties that bind group members to each other and by
emphasizing the differences that distinguish the group as a whole
and its individual members from other groups and their members.
The sharpening social cleavages that result from such
identifications and tactics based on these identifications lead
to greater ethnic tension, as the "middle ground"
between groups disappears.
In Sri Lanka, both S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike won
democratic elections by appealing to Buddhist-Sinhalese
nationalist sentiments and denigrating the ethnic Tamils. When
out of office, many of their principal political opponents did
the same. Indira Gandhi frequently courted support in India by
appealing to the Muslim vote or, alternatively, the northern
Hindu vote. For a time, Indira's Congress party was even seen as
the protector of Muslims 21. In the
United States, appealing to white racist sentiments is a staple
of political campaigning in racially divided Southern states.
Similar tactics are also used by more authoritarian leaders to
win support and retain power. Slobodan Milosevic, the former
Communist Party Chief of Serbia and General Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia won their presidencies by appealing to the most divisive
aspects of Serbian and Croatian nationalism.
Political
Mobilization and the Formation of Militant Groups
The factors that we have discussed so far -
historical legacies, a victim mentality, feelings of deprivation
and ethnic bashing leaders - all contribute to a climate that
encourages political mobilization along ethnic lines. As ethnic
differences begin to polarize a society, the formation of
militant groups becomes more probable. Intolerance of compromise
and commitment to attaining "ethnic rights" by using
violent force distinguish such groups. Young men - and sometimes
women - of military age comprise their core membership, often
designated by terms such as "soldiers" or "freedom
fighters." Charismatic - even mythical - figures lead them
and maintain group cohesion through rigorous, military-style
discipline and propaganda that reinforces xenophobic ethnic
stereotypes. Leaders of neighboring nations who sympathize with
their cause or hope for political advantages may provide
sanctuaries, training and arms. Funds may be raised from group
members living overseas or from illicit activities such as
selling illegal drugs. Examples of such groups include Peru's
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Palestine's Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
Northern Ireland's Irish Republican Army (IRA) and many others.
When militant groups become strong, the task of managing - let
alone resolving - ethnic differences is greatly complicated.
Redress of grievances that may have provoked political
mobilization in the first place is no longer sufficient to move
toward a non violent political order. Political polarization and
destruction of any middle ground where compromise might be
possible typifies militant group tactics for seeking absolute
political dominance. For militant leaders, it is "victory or
death;" there is no "political solution" other
than the triumph of their cause.
To understand why militant demands become more extreme - even
millenarian - as a conflict progresses, one needs to view
long-lived militant groups as viable social organizations whose
survival depends upon delivering tangible benefits to members.
Like businesses, government bureaus, research institutes and
organized crime "families," they provide identity,
personal fulfillment and a vocation. Since the
"business" of militant groups is violent conflict, it
is not surprising that group leaders and their followers may be
reluctant to abandon that vocation for the more mundane business
of day-to-day political leadership. Political leadership, even in
authoritarian regimes, involves striving toward complex and
ill-defined goals. It involves marshalling support and
adjudicating conflicting interests through negotiation and
compromise. Political leaders must collect taxes, maintain public
order, keep highways repaired, provide education, and see that
trash is collected. Small wonder that the simplicity of
unquestioning commitment to a militant cause may seem more
appealing 22.
Why Does Economic Development Often
Intensify Ethnic Cleavages?
Economic development inevitably produces
social tensions, even in ethnically homogenous societies under
the most favorable conditions. Understanding why this happens
owes much to Emile Durkheim's theories of collective action.
Durkheim argued that in times of rapid change, people become
alienated from an increasingly turbulent and fragmented society.
He labeled this sense of alienation, anomie, and argued that
extreme levels of anomie can lead to social tensions resulting in
violence. Contemporary scholars have noted that social alienation
heightens ethnic consciousness and receptivity to ethnic
nationalist appeals 23.
Development is often uneven across sectors and regions, with
agriculture generally being the most neglected sector 24. Cities and regions closer
to the capital tend to be favored above rural areas, and more
distant regions 25. In Spain, we see the
neglect of provinces such as the Asturias and the Basque region,
both geographically and culturally distant from Madrid, the old
Castilian capital. Likewise, Wales, Scotland, and northern
Ireland are claimed to suffer "internal colonization"
by nationalists in those regions which are far from London. The
Cabeza de Goliat (giant's head) phenomenon of a dominant capital
city, has been noted in many Latin American nations. Archipelago
nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines, neglect their
outer islands. Similar neglect has been the chief complaint of
separatist or regional movements in India.
Other inevitable stresses and strains in the development process
were first identified in writings on the industrial revolution in
Europe: the novels of Charles Dickens, Karl Marx's political
tracts and Karl Polanyi's writings on political economy. The
problems these authors identified sound familiar: the decay of
rural infrastructure and institutions, unplanned urbanization,
the emergence of new elites and social movements pressing for
broader political representation. Polanyi describes the struggles
of politicians and reformers to enact policies that would
minimize the effects of social disruption (such as the Poor Laws)
without fully understanding the causes of disruption 26.
Today, as in the 19th century, it is widely assumed that rapid
industrialization is the key to economic growth and that benefits
from economic growth will be broadly diffused with resultant
improvements in human welfare. Most contemporary economic
development models incorporate this view 27. However policies based on
these models often produce the problems about which critics of
the industrial revolution wrote. Industrialization and
urbanization cause tremendous socioeconomic upheavals. As workers
move to the cities, they strain existing resources and are better
placed to make demands on regional and national governments. A
highly urbanized population is usually more literate and better
organized. Newly urbanized young men from rural areas who move to
the city with unrealistically high expectations may be
particularly hostile to some cultural aspects of modernization,
and therefore ripe for radicalization 28. Many urban migrants tend
to be men; women and children are of-ten left behind in rural
areas, reducing the stabilizing influence of family ties.
Unattached males provide a pool of supporters for ethnic or
rel-gious organizations and they look to those groups for help in
finding jobs, medical care, entertainment and a sense of
belonging.
Global South governments are rarely equipped to meet either the
psychic or physical needs of their burgeoning urban populations.
Those left behind in rural areas are often exploited and ignored
by politicians who are preoccupied with maintaining a semblance
of order in the cities. Even under the best of economic
circumstances, both urban and rural populations may be ripe for
recruitment to political movements that offer a group identity
and the promise of a better life. Moreover, the chronic
volatility of most Global South economies results in precarious
job security and high unemployment plus the uncertainties
associated with high inflation. All of these factors increase
alienation and the attractiveness of ethnic nationalist
movements.
Job security and unemployment problems are further exacerbated by
educational systems that fail to produce the right mix of
graduates for available jobs. Universities and secondary schools
in developing nations have typically adopted practices of former
colonial rulers as models, particularly those of England, France
and Spain. Curricula have been heavily oriented toward the
humanities and social sciences. Continental traditions of
academic autonomy have reinforced natural inclinations of faculty
to resist change. In many institutions, proposals to shift
curricula in directions that would prepare graduates for
employment in an industrializing economy have been the most
resisted. The result has been secondary school systems that
create aspirations for a better life without providing the skills
to fulfill them. University education has been more effective at
breeding revolutionaries than graduates who could provide the
skills and leadership needed for economic development.
Why do
Political Leaders Opt for Diversive and Discriminatory Policies?
Citizens of Global South nations look to their
political leaders to provide psychic fulfillment, physical
security, economic benefits and the promise of a better life. In
many nations, fulfilling these demands would exceed the political
and management skills of even an exceptionally talented leader.
Politicians face four classes of problems that complicate the
task of leadership. We label these external problems, ignorance
about development, basic scarcities and demographic problems.
External problems are changes in the global economic and
political environment that adversely impact a developing nation
but are not accessible to control by its political leaders.
Fluctuations in the commodity markets for goods such as tea,
rubber and petroleum can have devastating affects on export
dependent economies. The decisions of Central Bankers in the
United States and Europe can dramatically increase debt service
costs, as debtor nations discovered in the late 1970s.
Multinational corporations may dominate a small nation's economy
and also engage in political meddling. International lending
programs such as structural adjustment are increasingly
encroaching on national sovereignty. Although the Cold war has
ended, regional hegemons, including the United States, Russia,
India, China and France are quick to apply both economic and
political pressure on smaller nations when it serves their
interests.
Ignorance about development refers to the uncertainty
that exists, both among politicians and "outside
experts," about which development policies will work best in
given circumstances. This problem was described brilliantly in
Peter Berger's development classic, Pyramids of Sacrifice
(1988). Berger argued that implementation of development policies
should be guided by the "postulate of ignorance." He
offered numerous examples of failed planning to support his view
that caution and incrementalism should be the watchwords of any
development program. One example of a failed policy that was
widely supported by conventional wisdom was import substitution
industrialization 29. Now,
development experts and international donors are pushing export
lead growth and structural adjustment strategies on Global South
nations. Evidence from Africa and Latin America indicates that
this approach can produce beneficial results in some nations, but
is no panacea.
Basic scarcities are a third class of problems not
readily accessible to political remedies. Many Global South
nations lack endowments of natural resources, agricultural land,
productive capital and technical skills necessary to meet even
the short run needs of their burgeoning populations. Declarations
of sovereignty and admission to the United Nations had no
prerequisite of economic viability. Technological optimists such
as Julian Simon point to Holland and Japan as affluent nations
that support high population densities 30. However, even the
optimists have yet to propose a clear path for resource poor
nations in sub Saharan Africa and Asia to follow through the
intermediate stages of the demographic transition.
Finally, there are demographic problems that are not
easily solved by politicians, especially in nations with strong
pro-natalist religious or cultural traditions. Many African and
some Latin American nations have crude birth rates in the range
of 2.5 to 3.5 per-cent per year or even higher. Many also
experienced negative growth rates in GNP per-capita during the
1980s. Under the most optimistic scenarios, these nations will
experience at least one doubling of their populations before they
stabilize. Few believe that these optimistic scenarios are
probable. Moreover, it is not only the size of these populations
but their age structure, heavily skewed toward the young, that
are cause for concern. While a young population can be a source
of energy and inventiveness for a nation, it also places heavy
demands on educational resources and is likely to be
characterized by high unemployment. A young, unemployed
population is a politically volatile population with high ideals,
an attraction to simplis-tic solutions for complex problems and a
predisposition to violence.
Even though the goals they are expected to attain may be
unattainable and the problems they are expected to solve may be
unsolvable, political leaders are still held accountable.
They are blamed for failures in areas where they may have had
little control and in nations with free elections, they are
likely to be summarily turned from office when things go badly.
Even in authoritarian systems their tenure may be precarious,
because a degree of support from at least some factions is
necessary to remain in power. It might follow that there would be
few aspirants for such an apparently unrewarding profession, but
this is not the case. The opportunity to exercise political power
attracts many able men and women for complex motivations that may
include commitment to service, personal financial gain and the
intrinsic appeal of power itself. Having gained power, few
leaders relinquish their positions voluntarily 31.
Because political power is attractive, but limited in its ability
to solve complex social and economic problems, few politicians
are able to resist opting for strategies with short-term payoffs
but adverse long-term consequences. When seeking office, the
temptation is to promise more than can be delivered, thus
creating popular aspirations that cannot be fulfilled. Use of
ideological and nationalist appeals is also a probable strategy.
"Flag waving" evocations of nationalist sentiments have
contributed to the success of many leaders. In ethnically diverse
societies we have seen that appealing to an ethnic group's sense
of victimization, offering special privileges to its members, and
promising to right past wrongs are particularly effective ways of
mobilizing support.
As a leader's time in office lengthens, popular support is likely
to diminish, even among ethnic compatriots. Unfulfilled promises,
the intract-ability of complex social and economic problems and
adverse external circumstances may all contribute to this loss of
support. Inexperience, corruption, the choice of an unsuitable
economic model and, in competitive political systems, the attacks
of rivals, may also threaten the leader's job security. Facing
loss of support and possible loss of power, a political leader is
more likely to engage in nationalist appeals and to seek
scape-goats, both internal and external, for policy failures and
unfulfilled promises. In ethnically diverse societies, rival
ethnic groups are a natural target for these attacks, especially
if those rival groups serve as an opponent's power base. If
ethnic majority support is needed to remain in power as, for
example, in India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Croatia, and Russia,
contending political leaders may stake out more and more extreme
positions on ethnic issues as a way of proving their bona
fides.
When a regime is authoritarian or democratic institutions are
weak, the leader may try to mute dissent by repressing opponents,
censoring the media or embarking on a foreign military adventure.
Postponing elections and declaring a "state of
emergency" are other common tactics that may be justified as
necessary to cope with an ethnic "enemy." As the
"enemy" turns to violence to express its resistance to
discriminatory measures, the need for extraordinary measures to
maintain civil order may become real. None of these tactics
necessarily help solve the problems that precipitated loss of
public support in the first place. They are more likely to
precipitate the destructive cycle of violent ethnic conflict
described earlier in this paper.
Diffusing the Tensions of Development
in Ethnically Diverse Societies
It is not clear that there is a receptive audience for
recommendations intended to diffuse ethnic tensions, either among
the national political leaders or leaders of international donor
organizations. We are skeptical because so much is known about
the styles of leadership and development policies that intensify
ethnic cleavages and provoke ethnic conflict. Yet both
politicians and planners continue to deny responsibility or plead
ignorance when conflict breaks out. "We had no choice"
is the plaintive cry of leaders on both sides who have become
embroiled in destructive and seemingly intractable ethnic strife.
"We didn't know" or "we weren't responsible"
are typical excuses given by planners who have either actively
promoted ethnically divisive development strategies or at least
passively supported their implementation. What this paper makes
clear is that we do know, at least in general terms, what causes
ethnic conflict. More important, there are choices between more
and less ethnically divisive development strategies and
leadership styles. In this concluding section, we detail some of
these choices.
Making
Ethnic Conflict Management an Economic Policy Goal
Economic development strategies must acknowledge the realities of
ethnic diversity and the economically disruptive potential of
violent ethnic conflict. Thus minimizing ethnic tensions may be
as important contributor to economic growth as diversifying a
nation's industrial base or promoting exports. Economic
development and conflict management strategies must be balanced
to provide reasonable economic benefits, with a reasonable degree
of equity across ethnic groups. Unfortunately, while most large
donor organizations have now recognized the importance of
governance, they have failed to acknowledge ethnic and regional
cleavages within recipient countries. Perhaps one cause of this
problem is the gulf that exists between the academic disciplines
of economics and political science. While political scientists
are increasingly studying national economies (if not econom-ics),
economists rarely study the politics or society of specific
nations or regions.
There are no simple formulas for designing policies that will
balance economic performance and inter-ethnic equity, but there
are some common-sense strategies. One is to reduce or avoid sharp
disparities in regional investment allocations, especially where
a nation comprises ethnically homogeneous regions. Economically
deprived regions on a nation's periphery often provide fertile
soil for militancy. Countries which have avoided sharp
disparities in regional investment include Tanzania, Malaysia,
and Singapore. Malaysia is working to reduce regional
disparities, especially now that its pro-Malay policies have
succeeded in building up a pool of educated and qualified Malays
who can provide leadership in region-al development.
There should also be ethnic pluralism in economic policy-making
so that dominant group leaders are sensitized to subordinate
group concerns before, rather than after, violence breaks out.
Employment and promotion practices in both the public and private
sectors should provide opportunities for the "best and the
brightest" among subordinate group members to become
participants in the system rather than turning them into
alienated revolutionary leaders. Few states have succeeded in
this respect; most have succumbed instead to the temptations of
preferential politics. Interestingly, Sri Lanka has continued to
appoint Tamils to some high political offices (though not to high
positions in the security forces), despite more than a decade of
ethnic civil war between the predominantly Sinhalese government
and militant Tamil separatists.
Cooptation
of Subordinate Group Leaders
Co-opting ethnic subordinate group leaders, by
granting them a significant economic role, while limiting their
political role, is a strategy that has been tried in Taiwan,
Malaysia and Indonesia. While the benefits are obvious, such a
strategy is often accompanied by increased centralization of
political power and elite corruption. There are also two
additional problems. First, minority group members may not be
satisfied with this bargain made at the elite level and may begin
to demand political rights that match their economic role. In
Taiwan, ethnic Taiwanese have been given more political rights,
but rights of Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia are more limited.
Second, such a bargain will not entirely eliminate ethnic
tensions within a population, since the rank-and-file of a
dominant ethnic group often resent minorities who play a
privileged and highly visible economic role. Ironically, ethnic
stereotypes can thus be reinforced by a few successful and
visible minority leaders.
In some circumstances, the lesser evil may be for dominant group
leaders to buy off ethnoregional elites with limited autonomy.
Use of this strategy guarantees these elites a quota of positions
in state institutions along with access to the benefits those
positions provide. The benefits may or may not be shared with the
minority elite's followers. Co-optation brings potential
revolutionaries into the system, but invites corruption and the
resulting rise of new and more radical elites. If they cannot be
bought off, as is the case with Islamic fundamentalists in
Algeria and Egypt 32, or the state
runs short of resources to buy them off, as is the case with
indigenous Indian groups in Mexico, the outbreak of ethnic
conflict has merely been delayed.
Devolution
of Power
Limited autonomy for ethnically homogeneous
regions (sometimes called "devolution of power") is
another strategy. The United States' successful experiment with
federalism has been offered as a model, although federalism did
not avert a civil war over slavery in the mid-nineteenth century.
However there are pitfalls that have made political leaders
reluctant to voluntarily embrace federalism 33. Governing
elites of newly independent states have been protective of their
power and fearful that ethnically homogeneous federal regions
might seek full independence. This is what happened in Nigeria's
Eastern Region, where the "solution" was to break up
the few large states into many smaller states, thus diluting the
power of major groups. The fear of secession was one factor in
the Sudanese leadership's ill considered decision to reimpose
centralized control over the mostly Christian and animist
southern Sudan, leading to a revival of civil war. When Sri
Lanka's S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike proposed limited autonomy for
Tamils in the mid 1950s, opposition Sinhalese politicians labeled
the proposal a "betrayal," eventually forcing the Prime
Minister to break his promise to Tamil leaders 34.
India's leaders opted for a form of federalism as a way of
responding to ethnic regionalism and have created a number of
ethnolinguistic territo-rial units. The Indian experience
provides useful lessons in both the benefits and pitfalls of
federalism. By and large, major ethnic groups seem to have been
satisfied with their own states within India and state leaders
have been circumspect about seeking additional autonomy.
Prob-lems have included meddling by central government leaders in
state governments and demands by ethnic groups not included in
the initial dispensations for their own states (in effect,
demanding the right to secede from existing states within India).
Some groups, such as the Assamese, went as far as demanding the
right to conduct their own "foreign relations" as if
they were independent. Other minorities, notably the Muslim
Kashmiris and the Punjabi-speaking Sikhs, see themselves
threatened culturally and religiously by the vastly dominant
Hindus and have supported violent separatist movements. Thus,
federalism in India has reduced ethnic tensions but has not been
a panacea.
Adopting
more conciliatory leadership styles
We have seen that political leaders often play
a key role in sharpening ethnic divisions and placing their
nations on a path that leads to violent ethnic conflict. Because
the pressures in this direction are so great, we do not
underestimate the need for courage and risks associated with the
alternative path being proposed here. First, leaders must educate
their publics about the realities of economic development and
avoid promises that raise unrealistic expectations. Second, when
inevitable disruptions and dislo-cations occur, they must resist
the temptation to blame rival ethnic groups.
Responsible leaders can educate their publics about the pitfalls
of development but this does not insure that publics will abandon
unrealistic expectations, much less that they will patiently
endure hardships. Moreover, there will always be irresponsible
leaders who are willing to promise unattainable benefits in
return for political support. So far South Africa is offering a
useful model of what may be possible. President Nelson Mandela
has warned his supporters that changes will be slow, and so far
there have been few protests. On the other hand Mandela is a
leader of unusual stature and the South African experiment is
new; most countries run into difficulties after the initial post
independence "honeymoon period." Poland's first post
indepen-dence government made herculean efforts to educate the
public about free market economics, but this did not prevent many
voters from supporting former Communists when unemployment
increased and prices began to outpace wages. Reform leaders in
other former Communist countries are facing similar problems.
It is even more important for political leaders to avoid ethnic
bashing. Again, South Africa provides a useful model, so far, but
not the only model. Nelson Mandela has defended the rights of the
white minority and insisted that his followers sing the
Afrikaaner National Anthem at symbolically significant public
gatherings. F.W. de Clerk has emphasized the importance of making
concessions to his Afrikaaner supporters. Malaysia's Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamid, while supporting preferential policies
for ethnic Malays, has strongly opposed ethnically divisive
political rhetoric. Another South Asian leader who made this
commitment was Sri Lanka's late President Ranasinghe Premadasa,
who used his unimpeach-able credentials as a Buddhist-Sinhalese
Nationalist to make peace overtures and some highly visible
symbolic concessions to the minority Tamils. Sri Lanka's newly
elected leader Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, has also
chosen to risk her presidency by making concessions, in the hope
of resolving her nation's ethnic conflict. It appears, then, that
a leader with strong popular support can choose not to play
"the ethnic card", especially when there is some public
recognition of the economic and social costs that protracted
ethnic conflict imposes on a society.
What we are proposing will not sound appealing to leaders of a
dominant ethnic group who are seeking to gain and maintain power
on the basis of ethnic nationalist appeals. However, recognition
that ethnic conflict is a costly negative sum game for a nation
is becoming more apparent to many. Violent ethnic conflict slows
economic growth by destroying physical infrastructure, motivating
talented individuals to migrate and frightening away foreign
investments. It will destroy a lucrative tourist trade if there
is one. It forces already unstable governments to build military
and paramilitary forces at the expense of other sectors. Strong
military forces may then threaten civil society and democratic
institutions.
Realistically assessing the causes and costs of protracted ethnic
conflict may begin to convince development planners that programs
which significantly increase the risks of violent ethnic conflict
are not economically justifiable. Such an assessment may alert
present and aspiring national leaders to a harsh reality: the
short term benefits from ethnically divisive political strategies
do not justify the long term social economic and political costs.
References
Azar, Edward, 1987. "Management of
Protracted Social Conflict in the Third World." Ethnic
Studies Report.
Azar, Edward, 1990. The Management of Protracted Social
Conflict: Theory and Cases.
Hampshire: Dartmouth.
Berger, Peter, 1974. Pyramids of Sacrifice. New York:
Basic Books.
Bookman, Milia Zarkovic, 1991. The Political Economy of
Discontinuous Development. New
York: Praeger.
Brautigam, Deborah, 1992. "Governance, Economy and Foreign
Aid." Studies in Comparative
International Development, Vol. 27: 3 (October).
Brautigam, Deborah, 1991. Governance and Economy: A Review.
World Bank Policy Research
Paper. December.
Coughlin, Reed and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1991. Economic
Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict.
London: Pinter Publishers.
de Silva, K.M., 1986. Managing Ethnic Tensions in
Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985.
Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
de Silva, K.M. and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1993. Peace
Accords and Ethnic Conflict.
London: Pinter Publishers.
de Silva, K.M. and Howard Wriggins, 1994. J.R. Jaywewardene of
Sri Lanka: A Political
Biography, Vol. 2. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Djordjevic, Dmitrije, 1991. "The Yugoslav Phenomenon"
in The Columbia History of Eastern
Europe. New York: Columbia University Press.
Durkheim, Emile, 1984. The Division of Labor in Society.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire,
England: MacMillan.
Durkheim, Emile, 1964. The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life. London, Allen and Unwin.
Enloe, Cynthia, 1980. Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in
Divided Societies. Athens: University of
Georgia Press.
Francis, Joyce, 1993. War as a Social Trap: The Case of
Tanzania. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, School of International Service, The American
University.
Gill, Sucha Singh, 1993. "The Punjab Accord and its
Failure." In de Silva and Samarasinghe
(1993), pp. 99-111.
Gurr, Ted R., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970.
Gurr, Ted R. and Barbara Harff, 1994. Ethnic Conflict in
World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press.
Gurr, Ted R., Minorities at Risk. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Institute of Peace Press, 1993.
Horowitz, Donald, 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
Hout, Wil, 1993. Capitalism, and the Third World:
Development, Dependence and the World
System. Hants, Aldershot, England: E. Elgar.
Kerbo, Harold R., "Movements of `Crisis' and Movements of
`Affluence': A Critique of
Deprivation and Resource Mobilization Theories." Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24:4
(1982).
Klitgard, Robert, 1991. Adjusting to Reality: Beyond
"State Versus Market" in Economic
Development. San Francisco, California: International Center
for Economic Growth.
Kuznets, Simon, 1971. Economic Growth of Nations: Total
Output and Production Structure.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mellor, John W., 1976. The New Economics of Growth: A
Strategy for India and the Developing
World. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press.
Mellor, John W., and Raisudden Ahmed, 1988. Agricultural
Price Policy for Developing
Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Nelson, Joan M., ed., 1989. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics
of Economic Adjustment. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.
Nelson, Joan M., 1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The
Politics of Adjustment in the
Third World. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Packenham, Robert A., 1992. The Dependency Movement:
Scholarship and Politics in
Development Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Parsons, Talcott and Neil J. Smelser, 1965. Economy and
Society. New York: Free Press.
Panda, K.K., 1993. "The Punjab Imbroglio: the Prelude to the
Accord of 1985." In de Silva and
Samarasinghe (1993), pp. 83-98.
Polanyi, Karl, 1957, The Great Transformation. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Richardson, John M. Jr., 1987. "Violence and Repression:
Neglected Factors in Development
Planning." Futures, 19:6 (December).
Richardson John M. Jr., and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, 1991. Economic
Dimensions of Ethnic
Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka. In Samarasinghe and
Coughlin (1991).
Rostow, Walt W., 1971. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non
Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
Sachs, Jeffrey, 1989. Developing Country Debt and the World
Economy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Simon, Julian, 1981. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Simon, Julian and Herman Kahn, eds., 1984. The Resourceful
Earth: A Response to Global 2000.
New York: Basil Blackwell.
Thomson, Leonard M., 1985. The Political Mythology of
Apartheid. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Tilly, Charles 1978, From Mobilization to Revolution.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
The World Bank, 1991. Managing Development: The Governance
Dimension. Discussion Paper.
The World Bank, 1989. Sub Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth.