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SINHALESE AND TAMIL MILITANCY IN SRI LANKA

Excerpts from Paradise Poisoned: Political Conflict in Sri Lanka

DUDLEY SENANAYAKE'S "MIDDLE PATH" GOVERNMENT (1965-70)

The Political Context

The 1970 General Election would mark a turning point in Sri Lanka's post independence history and culminate the peaceful revolution initiated by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956. For the first time, a party coalition won more than a 2/3 majority in Parliament. This gave Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government unfettered power to legislate a radical program and to amend Sri Lanka's constitution. The way in which this power was used will be described in the next chapter. Here, we examine the changing balance of political and popular forces that so fundamentally altered Sri Lanka's electoral landscape.

Since 1960, there had been a near balance of power between United National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom party lead coalitions, with Tamil and Marxist parties in pivotal positions to influence policy and even bring down a government if they chose to do so. After June 1970, Sri Lanka Freedom Party's control of 91 seats (a 60 per-cent majority) gave Mrs. Bandaranaike the option of governing alone, although she chose to keep pre-election pledges to her "United Front" coalition partners, the Trotskyite Ceylon Equal Society (Lanka Sama Samaja) Party and the Communist Party (Moscow wing). She and her allies interpreted the general election outcome as reflecting a major shift in mass political attitudes. According to this view, "the masses" had rejected the United National Party's elitist-capitalist-imperialist program and mandated a fundamental restructuring of Sri Lanka's economy and society along Marxist lines, with preferential treatment for Sinhalese Buddhists. How accurate is this view of the 1970 general election results?

British scholar James Jupp provides a revealing picture of the complexity and intensity of Sri Lankan political life during the late 1960s, which he depicts as a blend of traditional and "modern" elements. At the highest levels, parliamentary and party politics continued to be a game that was dominated by a British educated, English speaking, Colombo-based elite drawn mostly from the landowning (goyagama) caste. More than half the MPs maintained residences in or near Colombo. Many of the most influential belonged to one of Sri Lanka's four politically dominant family groups. Most Marxist party leaders were also wealthy and English educated, but from lower castes or lacking family ties and thus de facto disqualified for top leadership posts in the two major parties. Even the marginalized Tamil parliamentary leaders were part of this system. Jupp notes that top politicians had faced each other in the legislature for 30 years or more, contributing to a "conspiratorial and paranoid style of local politics."

Because hotly contested elections conveyed real political power, politicians tried to be aware of popular attitudes and constituent demands, but they were often out of touch with the lives and concerns of ordinary Sri Lankan peasants, industrial workers, shopkeepers and especially the younger generation. Many politicians, including Prime Minister Senanayake, may not have realized that Sri Lanka's voters, even rural voters, had become more politically discerning. A variety of newspapers, which circulated widely in a population more than 80 per-cent literate, now played an important role in raising political consciousness and voicing opposition concerns. The conservative Lake House and Times newspapers, which supported the UNP, still had the largest circulations, however pro-UNP organs no longer dominated print journalism as in the past. Two pro-SLFP dailies, the Sun (English) and Dawasa (Sinhala) supported the Sinhalese nationalist cause and mounted strong attacks on the government for "excessive" concern with Tamil rights. The Communist Party daily, Aththa, and the LSSP daily, Janadina, wrote sensational stories about high-level corruption and splashed eye catching headlines on their front pages that ridiculed government leaders. Modest reported circulations did not fully reflect the influence of these papers, because they were shared among many readers and became the basis for political gossip that reached remote areas via bus and truck drivers, travelling salesmen and returning relatives.

Access to radio and newspapers, forty years of reasonably fair elections, exposure to propaganda from competing parties, the reforms of the Bandaranaike years and periodic changes in government had made it clear even to rural Sri Lankans that political participation could produce tangible benefits. Moreover participation was encouraged by political rallies, meetings and elections that were among the few forms of mass entertainment in rural areas. Events were held throughout the years as well as during political campaigns to provide opportunities for party organizers, members of Parliament and potential candidates to meet with the people and mobilize support. According to Jupp, competition between political parties produced "the sort of enthusiastic interest attached to sporting teams" in other nations.

By 1970, Sri Lanka's historical pattern of voter loyalty to individual candidates was being supplanted by loyalty to political parties, which had become the principal intermediary between the people and the government. At least 600,000 people, over 10 per-cent of the electorate were enrolled in major parties, youth leagues and partisan union groups. In 1956, following Indian practice, each party was assigned a distinctive symbol, which designed its candidates on the ballot. Parties also had adopted their own colors (green for United National Party, blue for Sri Lanka Freedom Party, red for Marxist Parties) which were featured at rallies and on election posters. Candidates for both local and national offices counted on a small number of party professionals and larger number of volunteers to organize rallies, distribute posters and banners, serve as drivers and bodyguards and make up the core of uniformed marchers that led parades. In some constituencies, party organizations also included gangs of thugs who were responsible for the darker side of Sri Lankan political activity: disrupting and breaking up meetings, instigating riots, intimidating opponents' supporters on election day and, occasionally, even bombings and murder. Strong party organizations with some capability to maintain order and discipline reduced the prevalence of party switching that had been a common practice following independence. By 1970, parties had come to play a central role mobilizing support and developing strategies necessary to win elections.

The United National Party

At a time when strong organization and strategic planning were becoming more important, it was the UNP's misfortune to be torn by the personality conflict between its effective vote getter, Dudley Senanayake and its most skillful political manager, J.R. Jayewardene. Causes of the rift between the top UNP leaders have already been described. Differences regarding economic policy and political style were magnified by the intrigues of close associates, especially confidants of the Prime Minister with grudges against Jayewardene. Dudley Senanayake's own leadership style had changed little from the 1950s when Sri Lanka's politics were dominated by notables who relied on their personal reputations to win votes. Preoccupied with governing and confident of his popularity with voters, The Prime Minister neglected grass roots organization, underestimated the strength of a resurgent opposition and overestimated the force of his personal charisma in tipping the balance toward UNP candidates in a closely contested election.

The two cabinet members who gained power as Jayewardene's power diminished, Philip Gunawardena and I.M.R.A. Iriyagolle, were burdened with serious liabilities. Opposition speakers regularly reminded voters that Minister of Industries and Fisheries Philip Gunawardena was a "turncoat" who had once helped to shape S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's reform program as a cabinet minister. Gunawardena was not even a member of the United National Party, but headed a small splinter party that traced its roots to the Marxist left. Sri Lanka's business community, while supporting the Prime Minister, was unenthusiastic about a key economic management portfolio being given to a professed Marxist. I.M.R.A. Iryagolle, also a former Bandaranaike supporter, had played a key role legitimizing the UNP with Sinhalese-Buddhist activists during Mrs. Bandaranaike's regime. However as Education Minister, his attempts to reform universities with tightened admission standards, streamlined management and long range planning (see above) strengthened the motivation of university faculty and students, already predisposed toward Marxism, to defeat the UNP.

Finally, the UNP's program of recruiting talented, energetic young men to leadership roles faltered with Jayewardene's decline in influence and Senanayake's neglect of grassroots organization. The Prime Minister could be personally engaging with younger party members, but preferred to govern with a small group of associates whom he had known for years. During the 1965-70 period, young men with political ambitions saw little opportunity for advancement in the UNP and many gravitated toward the revitalized opposition. Not only was there a shortage of new blood, but key leaders of the 1965 campaign either dropped out of politics or joined Mrs. Bandaranaike. Senanayake's elitist governance style reinforced a popular image of the UNP as representing the upper classes and catering primarily to conservative commercial interests that had been its mainstays during the governments of D.S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala.

The UNP's difficulties were compounded by losing the unqualified support of two minority groups that the party had always counted as reliable allies. Roman Catholics were disaffected by the Prime Minister's broken promise to rescind the ban on fee-paying private schools, by his failure to appoint one of their number to the cabinet and by replacement of the traditional Sunday sabbath with Buddhist poya holidays based on phases of the moon. These moves lead the Church hierarchy and wealthy Catholics to reconsider their support for the UNP. At the same time, two young priests, Father Tissa Balasuriya and C.A. Joachim Pillai, founded a movement intended to make the Catholic Church more sensitive to social justice issues. Like the "liberation theology" movement in Latin America, Balasuriya and Pillai's teachings appealed to poor Catholics and made them more receptive to Marxist appeals emphasizing "economic justice" and redistribution of wealth. In 1969, a visiting French priest who had surveyed Roman Catholic political attitudes reported that "Catholics cannot any more be considered as one political group, but are as diversified as Ceylonese society itself."

Poor people's growing political awareness also eroded UNP support among Sri Lanka's Muslim community. Muslims comprised a majority in a few constituencies and the largest single group in others; both types of constituencies elected Muslims to Parliament, more often than not. Muslim community leaders were almost always involved in commerce and the two leading Muslim organizations had supported the UNP because of its pro-business philosophy. After 1967, Muslims seeking an alternative to the UNP could look to a new organization, the Islamic Socialist Front, which was founded by a Vice President of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Al-Haj Badiuddin Mahamud. The Front quickly developed a grass roots organization of more than 100 branches and in 1970, won four Parliamentary seats as a member of the victorious United Front coalition.

The United Front Coalition

Formation of the United Front Coalition in May 1967 culminated a move toward more pragmatic politics by its three leading members, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Sri Lanka Equal Society (Lanka Sama Samaja) Party and the Communist Party (CP - "Moscow wing"). In the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, conservative feudal landowners had been supplanted by men who were more sympathetic toward Marxist economics, less strident advocates of a Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist agenda and loyal followers of Mrs. Bandaranaike's leadership. Leaders of the two Marxist parties agreed to put aside ideological differences in the interest of gaining political power. Electoral power bases of the three parties were complementary. Rural constituencies in the Kandyan highlands had been dominated by the SLFP since the time of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. Sri Lanka Equal Society Party control over labor unions made it a strong contender in Colombo and Southern Province constituencies with high concentrations of wage laborers and government civil servants. The Communist Party also controlled several labor unions, held a "safe" Parliamentary seat in Colombo and was influential in the island's Southernmost district, Matara.

While the three coalition members maintained their own identities, the United Front manifesto made it clear that a fully integrated "people's government" would be formed following a general election victory. This consensus, unusual in Sri Lankan politics, created a formidable parliamentary opposition at a time when the UNP was struggling with its own internal divisions. Even more important, consensus made it possible to negotiate no-contest agreements, ensuring that voters who opposed the government in a given constituency would be able to support a single candidate rather than having to choose from among candidates representing the SLFP and one or more Marxist parties.

Fear of losing power for another five years helped to solidify the United Front but leaders of the three member parties each saw advantages to be gained by maintaining the coalition after an election victory. With the Marxists now in her camp, Mrs. Bandaranaike hoped to avoid the labor unrest that had plagued her previous administration. She also expected at least passive support from Marxist legislators for constitutional changes and legislation that would further institutionalize the Singhalese-Buddhist agenda in Sri Lanka. For their part, Marxist leaders were guaranteed cabinet positions that would allow them to reassert government control over the economy.

The United Front's proposed reforms were set forth in a twenty-five point "Common Program." Banks, heavy industry, the foreign owned tea plantations and imports of "essential commodities" were to be nationalized. Employment would be provided for those who lacked jobs, with special attention given to recent university graduates. Government distribution and price controls would ensure that "goods in everyday use" were widely available at cheap rates. Cheap loans, land reform and programs to make farm equipment more widely available would both stimulate agricultural productivity and improve the lot of small producers. The rice ration would be restored to its pre-1966 level. Popular participation would be broadened by guaranteeing political and trade-union rights for public servants, reforming the British-designed administrative structure and establishing a network of grass-roots committees to more closely link government and the people. In foreign affairs, the United Front promised closer ties with Communist nations, support for the Arabs in their quarrel with Israel (a position popular with Sri Lanka's Muslims) and strong anti-colonialist stands in international organizations.

On communal and religious issues, the United Front moved away from the militant pro-Sinhalese position favored by conservative elements in the SLFP, while still making it clear that the Sinhalese people and Buddhist religious would be given favored treatment. Coalition members sought a middle ground that would appeal to disaffected minorities (even Tamils) by attacking the UNP for its pro-Tamil stands, but simultaneously offering vague promises of "fundamental rights for all citizens." Few Tamils were converted, however this strategy, coupled with UNP blunders described above, did contribute to splitting members of the Catholic and Muslim communities from their traditional support for the UNP.

Sinhalese Militancy: The People's Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna)

The pragmatic decision of Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Marxist leaders to mute ideological differences and join forces reflected a time-honored strategy for winning power in a democracy by moving toward the political center where electoral majorities are found. Formation of the United Front was made easier by two distinctive characteristics of Sri Lanka's party systems that have already been described. First, party leaders, whether UNP, SLFP or Marxist, were all drawn from the nation's English educated elite. Second, party leaders were given broad authority to negotiate alliances and reshape programs.

A shortcoming of this cozy arrangement was that by the late 1960s, many young voters had become alienated from political leaders who seemed distant, unresponsive and self-serving. For Sinhalese youth, especially those living in the densely populated south, the promises of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's 1956 revolution remained unfulfilled. They faced high unemploy-ment and limited opportunities. Those who did work were employed as poorly paid laborers in agriculture, services and small manufacturing concerns. Colombo-based party leaders saw "the class struggle" as subject matter for political debate and the rhetoric of party manifestos; they were out of touch with the frustrations of Sinhalese youth who were struggling to overcome low wages and limited opportunities every day. These youth were alienated from Sri Lanka's established parties, but ripe for the appeals of a leader who would address their concerns and provide political opportunities that could make a difference in their lives.

Patabandi Don Nandasira Wijeweera, was a leader who responded to their needs. He took the name "Rohana Wijeweera" ("The Victorious Hero from Ruhuna") when he founded the People's Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) in 1967. This militant guerilla movement, espousing an ideology that improbably combined Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism with radical Marxism, seriously threatened Sri Lanka's government on two separate occasions, in 1971 and 1987-90.

Wijeweera's chosen name recalled the warrior traditions of Sri Lanka's independent southern kingdom which had stood as a bulwark of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism against the "foreign" encroachments of Sri Lankan and South Indian Tamils prior to the colonial era. The future militant leader grew up in Kottegoda, a small coastal town near Sri Lanka's southernmost city, Matara, and was the son of an ardent but relatively minor Communist Party functionary. In 1960 he received a scholarship to study medicine at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, but was forced to return home because of illness in 1964. Wijeweera's application for a visa to return to the Soviet Union was denied, apparently because he had engaged in pro-Chinese political activities while in Moscow, and he became for a brief period, a full-time paid functionary of the Communist Party (Peking Wing). A chicken farm near the small inland town of Kirinda, northeast of Matara, was purchased by Wijeweera and some followers in 1967 and became the Front's permanent base of operations. Here, Wijeweera codified the ideology of his movement in "The Five Lectures," which became the basis for an aggressive recruitment and indoctrination program for Sinhalese youth, beginning in 1968.

Major themes emphasized in the five lectures included the dangers from Indian expansionism, vulnerability of Sri lanka's neo-colonialist economy failure of post independence governments to improve the lot of most Sri Lankans, shortcomings of the old-line Marxist leaders and strategies for seizing political power in 24 hours. The Front's goal was fundamental social revolution which, Wijeweera argued, must be lead by the Sinhalese and organized for their benefit. He was vague about how the new Sri Lanka would be organized, but the Maoist states of China, Cuba, and Albania were suggested as models. Traditional fears of India were directed against the Indian Tamil plantation workers and Colombo traders with Indian origins. Both were identified as members of a fifth column, serving Indian interests. Wijeweera was doubtful that his ideas could gain mass support in Sri Lanka, but argued this would not be necessary. Instead, he proposed to organize a clandestine movement that would weaken the state "by staging great public shows and communicating a sense of ubiquity" intended to raise doubts about the government's capability to maintain public order. As public support eroded and the state security apparatus became demoralized, Wijeweera and his followers would seize power in a lightning stroke.

The People's Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) was an authentic grass-roots movement of the southern Sinhalese. In contrast to every other left wing group, it had no historical links with the Sri Lanka Equal Society Party (LSSP) and no ties with British Marxism of the 1920s and 1930s. Core leaders were graduates of former Buddhist seminaries that had been reorganized by the previous government as universities. Others were high school graduates and teachers from smaller rural towns. Mary were lower caste and appealed to caste-based resentments against the dominant landowning (Goyagama) caste. The Front built support de novo by organizing a series of "educational camps" where Wijeweera and other leaders gave lengthy discourses on the five lectures. In 1969, when the Front was publicly supporting Mrs. Bandaranaike, military training was added to the curriculum. Most recruits trained with modern replicas, pictures and blackboard drawings since few actual weapons were available. However a small elite cadre of highly trained armed militants also became part of the party organization at this time. A dual structure, comprising both a "democratic" political party and a clandestine network of militants, would be a feature of the JVP throughout Rohana Wijeweera's lifetime. By 1970, thousands of youths had participated in one or more programs and accepted Wijeweera's leadership. Interestingly, a number were former members of Dudley Senanayake's agricultural "land army."

The Tamil Parties

Chapter 6 described how the two Sri Lanka Tamil parties failed to protect Tamil language and religious rights against the rising tide of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism that S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's leadership catalyzed. Dudley Senanayake's return to power, supported by Tamil's Members of Parliament, offered hope that the Tamils' traditional strategy of high level negotiation and balance of power parliamentary politics might once again prove successful. Both the Federal Party and Tamil Congress were included in the National Government coalition. Federal party votes were essential to Dudley Senanayake's majority in Parliament. Senator Murugusan Tiruchelvam was the first influential Tamil politician to hold a cabinet post since Tamil Congress leaders G.G. Ponnambalam had been dropped from Sir John Kotela-wala's government in 1963; Ponnambalam himself was named Sri Lanka's representative to the United Nations. However despite the transformation in Sri Lankan politics between 1956 and 1965 and the Tamils growing alienation from the political mainstream, the structure and leadership of the two Tamil parties was not much different than in the early 1950s - authoritarian and elitist.

Unlike the Sinhalese parties, the Federal Party had failed to develop a grass roots organization and broaden its popular base. It was dominated by a loose confederation of wealthy landowning (vellala) caste. They still relied heavily on the political ingenuity of their infirm and aging leader, C.L.V. Chelvanayakam. When Sinhalese pressure forced Dudley Senanayake to abandon the Regional Councils bill, this provided further evidence that Chelvanayakam's strategy had outlived its usefulness, but the Federal Party leadership had no real alternative to offer. The party's position was further weakened by its strong opposition to reforms that would grant greater freedoms to lower caste Tamils and untouchables, which party leaders saw as threatening Jaffna's rigid caste-based society. During this period, lower caste Tamils were still forbidden to worship in Hindu Temples and subject to other prohibitions. Federal party opposition to reforms that would remove these prohibitions became another contentious communal issue and weakened the party's credibility as a supporter of "minority rights."

Ponnambalam's Tamil Congress, supported largely by Colombo-based civil servants with roots in Jaffna, continued to advocate the type of multi-ethnic Sri Lankan society, deemphasiz-ing regional differences, that had been favored by the Nation's first post-independence leader, D.S. Senanayake. Tamil Congress leaders opposed viewing ethnic differences as a problem of North versus South and favored parity of status for the Tamil and Sinhalese languages throughout the island. While many Tamils viewed the Tamil Congress as an anachronism, Ponnambalam had been regularly returned to Parliament by his loyal Jaffna constituents. His strategy was to promote the Tamil cause by exploiting long standing personal ties with top UNP leaders. This approach, too, was increasingly ineffective against the overwhelming pressures that Sinhalese nationalists, within the UNP as well as the opposition, could now muster. In 1970, all three Tamil Congress members of Parliament, including Ponnambalam, were defeated. The party did win three Northern Province constituencies that it had not previously held.

Earlier, we saw how high unemployment in the South, coupled with the unresponsiveness of Sinhalese political leaders, created conditions that made Sinhalese youth responsive to the appeals of the militant People's Liberation Front. What of Tamil youth in the North, where political leaders were even less aware and responsive? During this period, there is little evidence of the militancy among Tamil youth that would, in later years, come to dominate the politics of the North and even threaten the existence of Sri Lanka as an independent state. While no detailed study has been done to explain why this was so, it would appear both economic and educational opportunities were somewhat better for Tamil than for Sinhalese youth. Tamil youth benefitted from superior schools that gave them some knowledge of English and better preparation than their Sinhalese counterparts for University entrance examinations in law, medicine, engineering and science. Admission to Indian Universities in India's Tamil Nadu State was also common. Under Dudley Senanayake, Tamil youth could expect reasonably fair treatment in applying for positions in the civil service and state corporations (though the police and armed services were now largely off limits). Youth from Northwestern coastal villages in Mannar and Jaffna could combine income from fishing with a highly profitable smuggling trade. Thus, despite Sinhalese dominance of the central government Tamil youth could still see paths for advancement within Sri Lankan society, where intelligence, superior education and hard work would be rewarded. When Sirimavo Bandaranaike returned to power, she moved quickly, if unintentionally - in the name of providing greater opportunities for Sinhalese youth - to close off these paths. The resultant rise in militancy among Tamil youth during her administration was a predictable result.

SIRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE'S UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENT:

AN ERA OF RESURGENT BUDDHIST-SINHALESE NATIONALISM (1970-77)

Setting the Stage

Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government assumed power, as we have seen, with an unprecedent-ed mandate to effect the political, social and economic reforms described in the United Front's "Common Pro-gram." To symbolize a new political order, Parlia-ment's ceremonial opening was held for the first time in Colombo's Independence Hall, modeled after the grand audience chamber of Sinhalese Kandyan kings. Independence Hall, located in the center of a large plaza, has no walls; its massive roof is supported by columns which leave the precincts open. Ordinary Sri Lankans, who gathered in large numbers to cheer United Front leaders and jeer the tiny cohort of opposition parliamen-tarians, could witness the entire proceedings.

The new government moved quickly to implement its programs, but within the framework of Sri Lanka's laws and democratic institutions. United Front ministers were reform-minded members of the established political order, not revolution-aries. New legislation sailed quickly through a compliant Parliament, but implementa-tion moved more slowly. Drafting a new constitu-tion, a top government priority, took nearly two years to complete. In the economic arena, ministers worked to strengthen central planning institu-tions and prepare a detailed five year plan. As with constitutional reform, the first results from months of work were complex documents, not tangible benefits for the poor.

Early in its term, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's new regime faced two crises that made achieving its ambitious goals more difficult. In April, 1971, youthful People's Liberation Front (JVP) cadres, impatient with the slow pace of reforms, mounted a full-scale armed insurrection that nearly toppled the government. The insurrection diverted resources to the security forces and delayed reforms still further. Peace had scarcely been restored when a combina-tion of skyrocketing oil prices and declining rice production produced the worst trade deficits Sri Lanka had faced since indepen-dence. Foreign exchange reserves dwindled, imports were curtailed and the economy stagnated. A government that had promised poor Sri Lankans a cornucopia of benefits was instead forced to reduce the weekly measure of rice by half and impose bread rationing.

Economic deterioration was paralleled by deterioration in relations between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. Pro-Sinhalese provisions of the new "Republican Constitu-tion" were rammed through by an overwhelming Sinhalese majority, over Tamil protests. The document eliminated minority protections, prohibited federalism explicitly, and mandated privileged status for Buddhism. "Ceylon" became "Sri Lanka" a name that evoked ancient Sinhalese traditions. The changes convinced many Tamils that no Sinhalese govern-ment would treat them fairly. Pro-Sinhalese university admissions procedures angered Tamil youth, who began to throw their support to militant separatist move-ments. Tamil United Liberation Front was the new name chosen for a coalition of leading Tamil parties in 1976. The choice was intended to symbol-ize Tamils' growing belief that fair treatment, political rights and economic opportunity were now only attainable in a separate state, which they called Tamil Eelam.

A revi-talized United National Party under J.R. Jayewardene's leader-ship aggressively exploited these misfortunes by mobilizing anti-government demonstra-tions. The govern-ment responded with tightened press censorship and banned opposition party public meetings. In 1975, The Sri Lanka Equal Society Party (LSSP) left the coalition and precipitated strikes by its labor union allies that further damaged an already stagnant economy. Early in 1977, the Commu-nists joined them in opposition. Sri Lanka had gained international visibility in 1976 when it hosted the Fifth Summit of the Non Aligned Movement, but this did little to appease Sri Lankan voters. When they went to the polls in July, 1977, Sirimavo Bandaranaikes rump Sri Lankan Freedom Party government was defeated by an even greater landslide than its 1970 triumph. This chapter describes how Marxist economics and policies favoring the Buddhist-Sinhalese failed to provide promised benefits, contributed to growing communal hostility and lead Sri Lankans to return the United National Party to power.

Violent Political Conflict:

Fever Chart: Monthly Intensities of Political Conflict:

April 1965 - July 1977 (Figure 8-1)

If you ask Sri Lankans for recollections of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's second term "the JVP Rebellion" almost always looms large . The failed attempt of youthful revolution-aries to install a radical Marxist regime by force and aftermath of repression were common occurrences in develop-ing nations, but a shocking new experi-ence for Sri Lankans, who, despite sporadic outbreaks of ethnic conflict, viewed their society as "peace-ful" and "civil". The rebellion shows up as the first and highest peak on our "fever chart" for this period (Figures 8-1 and 8-2). There were also many more political killings and more conflict attributable to communal differences during Mrs. Bandaranaike's seven years in power.

Monthly Intensities of Political Conflict, With Major "Peaks" Identified:

June 1970-July 1977 (Figure 8-2)

The growing number of conflict events precipitated by commu-nal differences was a significant qualitative change (Table 8-2), compared with the previous five years. Between 1972 and mid 1976, communal strife between Sinhalese and Tamils replaced strikes and demonstra-tions as a principal contribu-tor to conflict "peaks". After the United Front Coalition fractured in late 1975, Marxist unions began harassing the government again with strikes and demonstrations. When the 1977 General Election date was set and cam-paign-ing intensi-fied, thuggery, bomb-ings, arson and politically motivated killings became more intense than during any previous pre-election period. Violence was now a more widely used political tactic in Sri Lanka.

Description of Violent Conflict "Peaks"

During Srimavo Bandaraniake's Second Government (Table 8-1)

DATES NUMBER OF

EVENTS MAX

INTEN SITY REGIONS/AREAS TYPES OF CONFLICT

MAR-MAY

1971 153 72 Rural areas of all Sinhalese majority provinces People's Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) insurrection. Typical events included bombings, attacks against and seizure of police stations, assassination of political and business figures and firefights between rebels and the security forces. Some destruction of post offices and other government buildings.

SEP-OCT

1972 17 27 Tamil majority provinces and estate areas First violent activities of militant Tamil youth: attacks on politicians using bombs and grenades; destruction of property. Non violent hartal organized by Tamil parties to protest new constitution. Strikes and demonstrations in estate areas and some labor unrest in other areas, including lengthy bank employees strike.

AUG-DEC

1973 29 26 Concentrated in Northern and Western provinces and in estate areas. Month long civil disobedience campaign organized in North by Tamil United Front; included demonstrations, mass fasting and defacement of government symbols. Strikes and demonstrations in estate areas against government policies. UNP lead satyagrahas against government repression. Also other labor unrest and some student demonstrations.

MAR-APR

1975 10 23 Island wide, plus additional events concentrated in Tamil majority provinces and Western Province. Island wide strikes of health sector personnel; killings by militants, demonstration against UNP rally and theft of bomb detonators in Tamil majority provinces.

OCT 1976-

JAN 1977 22 29 Island wide Strikes in transportation and health care sectors; sympathy strikes by university staff and students including clashes with police, damage to property and injuries.

MAR-JUL

1977 64 48 Island wide, but particularly concentrated in Colombo and the surrounding Western Province. Strikes in many public sector industries in health care and transportation; pre-election violence including burning of party election offices, bombings and killings; sabotage of several power stations including one causing an Island-wide outage.

The People's Liberation Front (JVP) Insurrection

The militant People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukti Peramuna) guerrillas who threatened Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government early in its term typified this acceptance of violence. In Chapter 9, I described how thou-sands of Sinha-lese youths, predom-i-nant-ly from the rural South, participated in JVP indoctri-nation classes and how a smaller number received at least rudimentary military training. During the general election cam-paign and following the United Front's overwhelming victory, JVP leaders continued to pursue a dual strategy of overt political organizing and clandes-tine military prepa-ra-tions. In an August 1970 newspaper interview entitled "Not guns, but criticism", student leader Mahinda Wijesekera characterized the JVP's public stance: "Our move-ment consists of true lovers of this country and poor masses," he said. "We have emerged to liberate our country from all imperialists and capitalist strangulation, even at the cost of our lives, to establish pure socialism and bring prosperity to the poverty stricken masses of our beautiful motherland."

Senior police officers in Dudley Senanayake's government had taken the JVP's threats serious-ly. They increased surveillance of the organiza-tion early in 1970 and arrested its leader, Rohana Wijeweera, in March. However Mrs. Bandaranaike at first viewed Wijeweera as sympathetic to her government. In pre-election publications and public speeches, he had called upon "democratic and peace loving people" to support the United Front and warned that the UNP's goal was to establish a dictatorship.

Releas-ing Wijeweera from prison was one of the new Prime Minister's first deci-sions.

Once freed, Wijeweera began holding a series of public rallies which drew large, supportive audienc-es and solidified his leader-ship position within the JVP. As it became clear that the government's "revolution" would be entrusted to old line Colombo politicians for whom elaborate plans and constitu-tional legal-isms took precedence over action, his speeches became more strident and the JVP one again began to attract police atten-tion. In a Febru-ary 27th address at Colombo's Hyde Park, Wijeweera, perhaps carried away by audi-ence enthusiasm, referred specifically to "the day of revolution."

Sri Lanka's Marxist politicians had spoken of "revolution" and "class warfare" on political platforms for years, but Wijeweera was serious. Plans for an armed insur-rection were in advanced stages and had been largely ignored by a govern-ment that was more concerned about threats from the right. By early 1971, the JVP's stock of arms had grown to more than 3,000 home-made bombs, plus shot-guns, revolvers and ammuni-tion. These were cached in a network of hideouts, many in Buddhist temples and on university campuses, through-out Sinhalese areas of the country. The revolutionaries plan was to begin the insurrection with simultaneous attacks on more remote police stations and jails that would drive security forces from rural areas. As those attacks gained momen-tum, a team of men was to seize the Colom-bo Main Power Sta-tion, blacking out the city. Following this, the Prime Minister would be abducted (possibly killed), key government installations in the capital captured, and the new revolutionary govern-ment proclaimed. JVP leaders compiled long lists of counter revolutionaries (prathiyas) to be killed after state power was seized. Dead bodies were to be dumped and buried in roadside ditches prepared in advance for this purpose.

Fortunately for the government, stepped up JVP bomb production in the first two weeks of March, 1971, produced a rash of accidents that aroused police suspicions. On two successive days small villages in rural Sabaragamuwa province were rocked by explosions that left several youths dead and revealed bomb-building workshops. Two weeks later, an acciden-tal detona-tion blew the entire roof from a Peradeniya Univer-si-ty resi-dence hall. Investigators who rushed to the scene discov-ered the hall was a hideout for a large cache of explo-sives and weap-ons. By this time, the police had already moved against the JVP leadership. Wijeweera was arrested on March 12, apparently while he was on a final mission to "brief the leaders of the revolution. By March 16, acting under newly imposed emergency regula-tions, police had taken more than 100 JVP activists into custody, transported them by military convoy to the North and incarcer-ated them under spartan condi-tions in an old Dutch Fort near Jaffna city.

The arrests pushed JVP leaders not in custody to implement their plans premature-ly. Early on the morning of April 5, armed youths began a series of attacks on rural police stations that surprised the security forces and alarmed the govern-ment, but failed to capture any major centers of power. Accord-ing to official sources, as as many 94 police stations were captured in nearly simultaneous attacks directed by a centralized leadership. More recent accounts describe the JVP as faction riven and the attacks as disorga-nized. They say initial JVP gains were due as much to decisions to withdraw police from rural areas by a govern-ment that had lost its nerve, as to rebel effective-ness. However there is no debate that at the high watermark of the rebel-lion, only a few days after the first attacks, Sri Lanka's securi-ty forces had ceased to function effective-ly in many rural areas of the South.

Despite early successes, it soon became clear that youthful enthusi-asm, a simplistic ideology and wishful thinking had been major ingredients in planning and initiating the insurrection. When the plan to seize power in a lightening stroke failed and there was no spontaneous popular uprising, JVP cadres were ill prepared to repel an offensive mounted by the Sri Lankan Army. Top JVP leaders, many now incarcerat-ed in Jaffna or Colombo, had made no plans for a hit-and-run guerilla campaign against superior forces that might have sustained the move-ment. The young men and women who had chosen to follow Rohana Wijeweera - as well as many who had not - would pay dearly for these miscalculations.

After a brief period of uncertainty, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government sought international assistance and soon counterattacked decisively and harshly. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India sent small arms and ammuni-tion, a squad-ron of four frigates to patrol the island's coastline, 150 Gurkha soldiers to guard the interna-tional airport, and six helicopters that flew combat missions under the direction of the Sri Lankan army. Army firepower was soon augmented by fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union, helicopters from the Soviet Union and the United States, ar-mored cars from the Soviet Union and Britain and police communi-cations equip-ment from East Germany. Strengthened by these additional resourc-es, the army moved quickly to reestablish control over settled areas and round up dissidents. Often, their sorties were preceded by strafing aircraft or helicopters that killed local peasants and villagers indiscriminate-ly. by June, most orga-nized resistance had ended and more than 14,000 "young men and women gone astray" (the words of Prime Minister Bandaranaike's amnesty declara-tion) had given them-selves up. Govern-ment detention camps, including the Vidyodaya and Vidylankara University cam-puses held more than 16,000 prison-ers. Small groups of JVP followers that had re-treat-ed to the jungle contin-ued the fight until early 1972.

As they reestablished control over disputed areas, government forces often dealt severely with rebels and suspected rebels; reserve units in particular became known for cruelty and indiscipline. Anonymous tips were solicited by security teams to identify JVP members and sympathizers. Those identified, as well as their relatives, were tortured to extract confessions and additional names. As in later conflicts, individ-u-als were some-times fingered as JVP supporters by personal enemies who wished to settle scores or gain a business advantage.

One of the most vivid stories told by Sri Lankans to illustrate the cruelty of army retribution during this period concerns the death of Premawathi Manamperi, a beautiful young woman who, in 1970, had been named new year's festival Queen for Kataragama District, home of one of the nation's most sacred Buddhist shrines. An informant identified Premawathi as a JVP leader and an army unit that had entered Kataragama took her into custody. After questioning by the Lieutenant command-ing the unit (many allege that she was repeatedly raped as well as questioned) Premawathi was stripped of her clothing and forced to march naked through the city where she had reigned as festival queen. Here is the story of her death march, as quoted from court records:

[Lieutenant] Wijesuriya then directed her to walk along the main road with her hands held over her head exposing her nakedness and reciting the words, "I have followed all five lectures." Wijesuria and Sergeant Ratnayake armed with Sterling sub-machine guns walked on either side. When she had proceeded about 200 yards along the road, she turned towards the post office. Wijesuriya then kicked her on the hip and opened a short burst of fire on her. Then the girl fell, she crawled some distance and having got up, walked and fell again. Wijesuriya and his companion then returned to the camp. Then one of Wijesuriya's men shouted that the girl was still alive whereupon Wijesuriya ordered Ratnayake to go and shoot her. Ratnayake then went up to the place where the girl lay fallen and opened another short burst of fire on her. One [man] Aladin, who had been asked by the Army men to dig a pit and bury the girl re-ported twice that she was still alive and thereafter an uniden-tified soldier went up and shot her through the head with his rifle. She died immediately and was buried with her clothes in the pit.

There is no accurate count of the death toll from the rebellion. Official records list 53 security force personnel dead and 323 injured. Estimates of the number of non security force personnel killed vary from about 1,000 (in official reports) to more than 10,000 (in some popular accounts). Government interrogators spent more than two years interro-gating the detainees. About 10,000 were released without charge. 2,492 pleaded guilty and were given suspended sentences. 390, including 31 top leaders were convicted and jailed. Twelve years imprisonment at hard labor (rigorous imprisonment) was the most severe sentence imposed.

The Potential for Violence in Sri Lankan Society

What factors most contributed to changes in political conflict patterns during Sirimavo Bandaranaike's term in office? One must be cau-tious in generalizing. It is easy to point to a political climate in which respect for public order was diminished by inflammatory rhetoric and by actions of a politicized security establishment that was now predominantly Sinhalese. Staple goods shortages and a stagnant labor market, following a political cam-paign that had prom-ised expanded economic and social benefits for all, contributed to widespread feelings of deprivation that were eventu-ally reflected in the 1977 general election results. Deprivation was felt most deeply by Tamils who viewed government policies as discriminatory and the 1972 Republi-can Constitution as a document that institutionalized prefer-en-tial treatment for Sinhalese. Long-term demo-graph-ic trends contrib-ut-ed to the potential for violent conflict, by continu-ing to flood the labor market with educated youths whose employ-ment expectations could not be met.

Note must also be taken of the potential for explosive violence that, accord-ing to some observers, lurked below the superficially tranquil surface of Sri Lankan society during this period of rapid change. This has been emphasized in a recent article by University of Edinburgh Anthropologist Jonathan Spencer that draws upon work by scholars such as Bruce Kapferer , Gananath Obeyesekere and Stanley Tambiah . According to these authors, Sri Lankan social norms offer few intermediate responses between passivity and explosive violence for dealing with interrelated stresses produced by econom-ic adversi-ty, rapid social change, a rigid class structure and communal tensions. Buddhist ethics, for example, "allow no space between complete non violence and the sin of violence; [thus] the appearance of violence ...tends to be impulsive and uncon-trolled." Popular images, says Spencer, "usually portray violence as emanating from either demons or kings, catego-ries of being who, in their different ways, embody all the things which ordinary people are not." It follows that those who employ violence may view them-selves as "'crossing over" from the world of every-day normal sociability into the extraordinary realm of demons and kings. Normally, fear of the humiliation that would result from violating the social norms against violence restrains aggressive impulses and is "a key mecha-nism for main-tain-ing order." But when this fear is over-whelmed by anger or removed by socially sanctioned justifications for attacking an enemy, violence can erupt "suddenly and wildly."

In everyday life, Spencer reports, murder, suicide and sorcery are common manifesta-tions of aggressiveness. Research shows that these manifesta-tions were prevalent and increasing between independence and the 1970s. Even prior to 1970, Sri Lanka's homicide rate ranked it with violent nations such as the United States (although some develop-ing nations had even higher rates). Evi-dence also indicated that homicides were much more often the result of "sudden quarrels" than premeditated. Spencer points to a study by Kearney and Miller which shows that suicide rates nearly tripled between time of indepen-dence and the 1970s. Sri Lanka's youth were particularly likely to take their own lives. Between 1955 and 1970 there was a fourfold increase in the suicide rate for young men and women between the ages of 20 and 24. Suicides were highest among Tamil youth. It also appears that sorcery, used more by women and urban or semi-urban dwellers to express aggression, was on the increase following indepen-dence.

The potential for harnessing latent aggressiveness to serve political ends had been exploited, even prior to 1970, by politicians who used "thuggery" to break up opponent's political meetings and intimidate their supporters. Rohana Wijeweera was the first to exploit this potential on a national scale. His five lectures skillfully combined themes from Marxism and Sinhalese classics such at the Mahavamsa to cloak his movement in nationalist mythology and demonize opponents, thus justifying violence. The viciousness with the insurrection was fought on both sides lends credence to the view that collective violence in Sri Lankan Society has reservoirs of latent aggressive-ness upon which to draw.

Earlier, I urged caution in generalizing about increases in violent conflict during Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government. If one looks backward from 1977 rather than from 1988, the rise in militancy and killings seems less significant. To many, viewing the short lived JVP rebellion as a troublesome, but idiosyncratic event seemed justified. There appeared to be a return to "business as usual" politics in Sri Lanka after 1972. The growing militancy of Tamil youth was worrisome, but seemed fragmented and peripheral. Increasing stridency of Tamil politicians, including talk of "liberation" and "the Tamil nation" could be dismissed as rhetoric, especially when TULF leaders returned to traditional pre-election maneuvering in the Spring of 1977. Business as usual politics produced the rash of strikes which weakened the government in 1976 and 1977. Disintegration of the United Front coalition resulted from typical squabbling among party leaders over policy and personal differences. Left wing union tactics were similar to those used successfully against Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government in 1964-65 and against Dudley Senanayake's government in 1968-70. Even the 1977 general election, despite somewhat higher levels of violence and a much greater number of killings, was a business as usual affair. Sri Lankans, seemed to retain their faith in democracy and gave overwhelming support to the most conservative of the traditional parties. Interestingly, in the Southernmost part of the island, it was rural Sinhalese youth "who supplied the foot soldiers for the victory of the United National Party Machine in the elections of 1977 and 1982."

The People's Liberation Front (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) As a Social Movement

Much has already been said about the origins, organization, and ill fated insurrection of the youthful People's Liberation Front (JVP). However some of the questions that most troubled Colombo's ruling elite in the aftermath of rebellion remain to be answered: From what segments of Sinhalese society were the rebels recruited? What motivated them to take up arms against a socialist/Marxist government in the developing world's most democratic and welfarist society? If they had success-fully seized power, how might they have restructured that society?

Answers to the first question have been provided by Sri Lankan anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere who analyzed statistical data collected by government officials on 10,192 "suspected insurgents" in police custody. Not surprisingly, the rebels were overwhelmingly male, youthful and Buddhist. Although many JVP leaders came from Rohana Wijeweera's karava caste, more than half of the suspected insurgents were from the landowning goyagama caste and Obeyesekere discounted caste as a factor in the rebellion. Data on education and economic status pointed to factors that were more significant. More than 85 per-cent of those incarcerated reported they attended rural secondary schools where Sinhala was the language of instruction. These beneficiaries of language and education reforms were often the first in their families to have attended secondary school. When educational background was combined with data on occupation and income, a clear picture of frustrated economic aspirations emerged. More than 90 per-cent of the youths in Obeyesekere's sample held poorly paid, low status positions or were unemployed. In an earlier era, secondary education would have qualified these men for a reasonably paid secure job at least and possibly for entry into lower rungs of Sri Lanka's middle class. Population growth, coupled with economic stagnation ruled this out for most. Contradicting the views of many Colombo officials, Obeyesekere found that few suspected insurgents had university educations or high status jobs. Only 202 out of 10,192 reported they had attended a university. Less than 2/10 of one per-cent were classified as having "elite" occupational status. "Casual laborer", "cultivator", "student" and "unemployed" were the occupations most frequently reported.

Trends and social structures that contributed to youthful frustrations have been described earlier. Population growth was pushing down the size of rural landholdings, particularly in the South. Children could no longer expect to be fully supported by produce from their father's land. Many joined a growing agricultural "lumpenproletariat" whose members were under constant pressure to produce additional income. When they sought a job or tried to start a small business, they were often blocked by interlocking systems of political patronage and elite dominance. Anthropologist Paul Alexander points to the pervasive influence of rural elites who maintained their power through networks of patron-client relationships based on trading jobs, credit and gifts for political support. Their approval was necessary to open a market stall, theater or bar, to run a truck or bus route, or to produce the fermented coconut liquor (toddy) popular with poor Sri Lankans. They served as intermediaries for government programs that supplied loans and basic supplies. They became involved in the government-managed systems for purchasing and distributing basic consumer items such as rice, textiles and kerosine. They collaborated with members of parliament to allocate government and state sector jobs. Substantial income they received from gifts, fees and bribes helped them to maintain their privileged position.

When rural youth spoke of reform, it was this elite dominated rural patronage system they were most interested in reforming. We have already seen how the slow pace and legalistic orientation of reform measures initiated after Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government came to power frustrated them. But even more frustrating was a growing belief that the 1970 election landslide had changed nothing as far as the rural patronage system was concerned. " Rightly or wrongly," Obeyesekere concludes, "the youths I interviewed felt their local MP had been bribed by persons of wealth in the area." The use of job quotas by newly elected MPs to build alliances with former opponents was, apparently, a common and disillusioning pattern. This contributed to a widespread sense of injustice that strongly motivated young men to join the JVP.

What was the social political order the JVP cadres envisioned as a replacement for Sri Lanka's social and political institutions, following the triumph of their movement? As noted in Chapter 9, Rohana Wijeweera was somewhat vague on this point, but expressed admiration for the Maoist states of China, Cuba and Albania. His model was a self sufficient, egalitarian society, based on agriculture, with peasants as the backbone (as in Mao's China) and with land fully collectivized to ensure equality. A Buddhist-Sinhalese nationalism that harked back to myths of Ruhuna heroism and opposed foreign (especially Indian) ties, reflected the movement's southern roots. There was hardly a pretense that the movement would govern democratically once in power. Strong leadership and one party rule were needed, Wijeweera argued, to implement a consistent development strategy that would transform Sri Lanka.

As we saw earlier in this chapter, the degree to which the JVP had a centrally controlled organizational structure is debated, with early reports accepting the government's view of a centralized command directing a network of cells and later revisionist scholars expressing skepticism. Two recent studies, which claim to be based on "insider" information, fail to resolve the debate. Gunaratna, who, provides the greatest detail, describes an organizational structure that included a twelve member politbureau, 19 district secretaries, separate student and worker's organizations and two specialized "wings" of the party with responsibilities for "propaganda and agitation" and with "arms and ammunition." Chandraprema, however, suggests that the command structure was far from unified because of factional disputes over policy and the top leadership position. Whatever the reality, clearly the arrest of Wijeweera and other top leaders seriously hampered both the initial attacks and the response to government counterattacks. The 1987-1989 JVP rebellion's devastating impact provides evidence that Wijeweera, despite idiosyncracies, was a ruthless and inventive guerilla leader who could command a significant following. Without such leadership, and with many members in detention, the JVP fragmented into small factions and ceased to exist as an effective force after 1971. This did not mean, however, that the social and economic problems which motivated JVP supporters to take up arms had been solved. When J.R. Jayewardene repeated Sirimavo Bandaranaike's error by releasing Rohana Wijeweera from prison, the movement was resurrected and nearly achieved its goal of toppling Sri Lanka's government.

Tamil Militant Groups:

While Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government was preoccupied with maintaining Sinhalese support and with foreign policy, militant groups began to reshape the Tamil community's political agenda. Earlier in this chapter, we saw how militant initiated violence began to erode government authority in Tamil majority regions and push traditional Tamil parties toward more extreme positions on communal issues. How and why did Tamil militant groups emerge and become viable during the United Front's years in power? Who were their members and leaders; what was their relationship to the larger Tamil community? What potential did these groups have to marshal resources and mobilize support that would enable them to achieve their goal of an independent Tamil Eelam? Few Sinhalese political leaders were concerned with finding answers to such questions at a time when answers might have made a difference to the future of their nation.

Before addressing these questions a brief review of where Sri Lanka's Tamil population was concentrated at the time of the 1981 census will throw useful light on Sri Lanka's widening ethnic divisions and on proposals for an independent Tamil Eelam, to be discussed below. The highest concentration of Tamils, more than 95 per-cent, was found in Jaffna district, located on the northernmost part of the island and the location of the island's second largest city. Not surprisingly it was in Jaffna district that government attempts to forcibly impose Sinhalese culture on a homogenous Tamil population of more than 800,000 met greatest resistance. Batticaloa district, located far to the South of Jaffna on the East coast, numbered more that 70 per-cent Tamils among its population of 328,000, with a concentration of more than 90 per-cent in Batticaloa city. Batticaloa Tamils were separated from their counterparts in Jaffna district and Trincomalee coast by a band of predominantly Sinhalese and Muslim areas of settlement. In contrast to Jaffna, Batticaloa was one of Sri Lanka's poorest regions and physically remote from the nation's economic and political heartland by circuitous highway and train routes through mountainous terrain. A significant number of Tamils, were also concentrated on the coast of Trincomalee district, just South of Jaffna district. Tamils shared multiethnic Trincomalee city, surrounding one of the worlds most spectacular natural harbors, with a large Tamil speaking Muslim population, but few Sinhalese. The predominantly Sinhalese population surrounding Trincomalee city and the coastal strip to the north included a number of recent migrants who had been relocated by government "colonization schemes." These schemes were, as we have seen, highly unpopular with Tamils. Tamils also comprised the majority of sparsely settled Vavuniya district's population of only 83 thousand. About 180 thousand Tamils lived in Colombo, representing about 10 per-cent of the capital city's 1.75 million population. Interestingly, Tamils living in Colombo were the third largest Tamil grouping in Sri Lanka and, on a per-capita basis, the wealthiest and most highly educated. Many were successful lawyers, physicians, businessmen and, despite 20 years of preferential treatment for Sinhalese, senior officials in Sri Lanka's government.

This geographic distribution of Sri Lanka's Tamil population, in relation to other ethnic groups, should be kept in mind as we return to a consideration of how Tamil militant groups grew to a position of influence during the 1970s.

Political activism among the Jaffna Peninsula's educated youth was not new, but had never been viewed as a major threat. When Sri Lanka's British rulers formed the first locally elected State Council in 1931, Jaffna Youth Council members called for an island-wide election boycott because the new structure did not provide for total independence. Jaffna residents supported the boycott, though other Sri Lankans did not, and the Peninsula's four Council Seats were not filled until 1934. After independence, Jaffna youth had actively participated in the intensifying confrontations between Tamils and government officials over communal issues including the anti Sri campaign, "black flag" demonstrations, civil disobedience campaigns (satyagrahas) and general strikes (hartals). In 1961, a young group of Federal Party activists who rejected Chelvanayakam's Gandhian philosophy formed The Army of Tigers (Pulip Padai), appropriating for their symbol, the standard of the ancient and powerful Tamil Chera Kingdom. Members met secretly in the precincts of Koneswaren Hindu temple, overlooking Trincomalee Harbor, and swore a solemn oath to fight for an independent Tamil Eelam. The "army" did not survive Federal Party participation in Dudley Senanayake's government, but even during the relatively tranquil 1965-70 period, young Tamil activists distributed pamphlets advocating mili-tant action against the gov-ern-ment that in-clud-ed a poet-ry col-lec-tion allegorizing a "Ti-ger Ar-my."- An orga-niza-tion of Peradeniya and Colombo Tamil students, Ilaingal Ondriyam, published essays in their journal, Thamil Ilainjan, drawing parallels between Sri Lanka's Tamil majority regions and Nigeria's Ibo secessionist province of Biafra. Tamil youth were also influenced by the domestic politics of Tamil Nadu state where in 1967, the Tamil nationalist Dravidian Progressive Front (Dravida Munnethra Kazhagam ) ousted Indira Gandhi's Congress party from control of the state government for the first time. There was little overt militant activity, however, perhaps because Tamil youth with ability could still anticipate that a superior education plus hard work would provide opportunities for a good job and reasonable economic security.

The 1970 election landslide, followed by United Front policies that Tamil youth viewed as overtly racist, changed this optimistic outlook and soon canalized the formation of militant groups. As we have seen, successively more discriminatory university admissions standards, beginning in 1970 were the poli-cies that im-pact-ed Tamil youth most di-rectly and con-tribut-ed most to alien-ating them. Pro-Sinhalese hiring practices by government departments and by the increasingly dominant state economic sector motivated youths who might previously have migrated South to remain in Jaffna, even with no prospects of a good job. Youths who might have traveled to Europe, the United States or India for university degrees, but were kept home by foreign exchange controls, also remained in Jaffna, where they nursed grievances against the Colombo government. Many of the problems faced by Tamil youth - university admissions pressures, scarcity of jobs and restrictions on foreign travel - impacted Sinhalese youth as well. However many Tamil politicians, like their Sinhalese counterparts, encouraged racial scapegoating. Tamil pride was strengthened by a cultural revolution in Tamil Nadu that produced a flowering of literature, poetry and especially films, much of which moved across the Palk Straits to Sri Lanka. The fact that Sinhalese politicians, including Prime Minister Bandaranaike herself, often blamed "Tamils" for the nation's problems further encouraged polarization along ethnic lines within this most volatile sector of the Tamil population.

The early 1970s were also a time when two violent uprisings - the JVP rebellion and the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan - captured the imagination of Tamil youth. For secondary school and university students, the uprising of their Sinhalese counterparts against an unpopular government made the possibility of revolutionary violence more concrete. There were also direct contacts. Some JVP detainees in Jaffna shared prison facilities with young Tamils, including young men who had been incarcerated for political protests. Tamil youths were able to learn about tactics that had been successful in the South and discuss reasons why the rebellion failed.

Events leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh provided a more useful model for young Tamils. Democratic elections held in December, 1970, had given Mujibur Rahman's Awami League an overwhelming victory in West Pakistan. Responding to delays in recognizing the election by Pakistan's military regime, the Bengali leader mobilized Gandhian style demonstrations to back political autonomy demands. When Pakistan's government responded with armed intervention, Mujibur proclaimed the independent Republic of Bangladesh. He was immediately arrested and condemned to death. The insurgents would almost certainly have been defeated by Pakistan's well equipped army but for India's intervention. First, India provided sanctuaries and arms for the Awami League's "Freedom Force" (Mukti Bahini). When this proved insufficient, India's army intervened directly and quickly overwhelmed the Pakistani forces. Mujibur was freed and by Spring 1972, an independent Bangladesh had gained international recognition. For Tamil youth, contrasts between the JVP's defeat and the Awami League's victory illustrated the value of a sanctuary and of Indian support. They further concluded that Indian military forces might support an armed struggle for independence under some circumstances. "Yuri Desh" and "Eela Desh" became part of the political graffiti that young Tamils scribbled on Jaffna walls.

In an environment where martial arts classes attracted a growing clientele, repressive acts by a Sinhalese police force that was increasingly out of touch with the community, provided an additional push toward militancy. In addition to major confrontations that produced "martyrs", there was almost daily friction between young Tamil men and young Sinhalese men of the same age who wore Sri Lanka police uniforms and thus symbolized the Sinhalese dominated government. In 1972, 42 young men were arrested for putting up posters opposing "standardization" of university admissions. Authorities invoked emergency regulations to incarcerate them without trial for two years. Police tear gassing of the Fourth International Conference on Tamil Research plenary session, that resulted in 7 or more deaths, has already been described. Tamils were angered not only by the police intervention, which they viewed as unprovoked, but by Prime Minister Bandaranaike's defense of the police in Parliament and refusal to order an investigation. Parliamentary debates were regularly reported in Jaffna, where this indifference to questions about police actions was viewed as one more instance of Tamil rights being "treated with contempt" by Sinhalese authorities. Government prohibitions against importing books, films and magazines from Tamil Nadu were viewed as another form of Sinhalese oppression.

In contrast to the JVP leadership's limited political-economic vision, Tamil youth and academics had thought seriously about the economic viability of an independent Eelam. Initial plans developed by a group of Peradeniya undergraduates were refined by faculty and students at the newly founded Jaffna Campus. Their proposals looked much more like Singapore or Taiwan than the self sufficient agrarian society envisioned by the JVP. In broad outline, their analysis and plan was as follows: Tamil regions already produced rice, fish and vegetables that could be consumed or used for trade but lacked industrial capacity. This obstacle would be overcome by establishing an export processing zone, capitalizing on Trincomalee's natural harbor. A wealth of entrepreneurial talent and capital to initiate development would be available from successful Tamil businessmen. Educated Tamil youth would provide a high quality labor force for new enterprises. Once a critical mass had been established, it would be easy to attract additional capital and technology from the Tamil diaspora and other investors. The Tamil Eelam government's role would be to raise revenue and coordinate development plans for the benefit of the local population. Freed from Sinhalese oppression and exploitative policies administered from Colombo, this would not be difficult to accomplish. The Eelam proposals made it clear that linking Jaffna's and Batticaloa's Tamil populations by incorporating the multi ethnic Trincomalee region was essential to the new nation's viability. However no serious attention was given to issues of self determination or minority rights for the region's large Sinhalese and Muslim populations.

Given the circumstances I have described - economic hardships, cultural revitalization, government policies viewed as oppressive, dissatisfaction with mainstream Tamil parties and the vision of an economically viable Eelam - formation of youthful militant groups was not surprising. Initially, the form these groups assumed was very different than the JVP's relatively centralized structure. Their lineal ancestor was the Tamil Students' League (Tamil Manavar Peravai), founded in 1970, which became the Tamil Youth League (Tamil Elaingyar Peravai) in 1973. The League had no formal links with the Tamil United Front, but under the direction of the Front's second in command, Appapillai Amirthalingam, its youthful members sometimes served as TUF footsoldiers. If the TUF announced a general strike, those who did not comply were often beaten and their businesses vandalized by gangs of young men operating with Amirthalingam's tacit approval. A small number of Tamil youths, however, were becoming dissatisfied with Chelvanayakam's pacifist principles and attempts to compromise with Sinhalese leaders that seemed to produce defeat after defeat. Unequivocally committed to an independent Tamil Eelam, in contrast to the TUF leaders, they began to organize in secret and plan more violent actions against the government including sabotage, bombings and assassinations. By this time, some Tamil politicians had begun using the rhetoric of "armed struggle." For example at a 1972 public meeting, a speaker described government supporters as "enemies of the Tamil nation." "They do not deserve to die a natural death," he told his audience. "Nor do they deserve to die in an accident. The Tamil people, especially the youth, must decide how they will die." Some Tamil youths were taking such statements seriously.

Militant sentiment was particularly strong among young men of the Kariar (fisherman) caste who lived on the Jaffna Peninsula's northernmost "smugglers coast" between Point Petro and Kankesanthurai. Resistance to authority was nothing new among these coastal dwellers whose families had combined smuggling with seafaring for generations. As in the South, fishing caste members were known for their independence and entrepreneurial ability. Not only did Kariar youth oppose Sri Lanka's government, they had little use for the Vellala (landowner caste) dominated mainstream political parties or for the caste conscious rigidities of Jaffna society. It is not surprising, then, that two of the early militant groups trace their origins to Velvettiturai town, a conservative fishing community of about 10,000 nicknamed "smuggler's paradise", located almost midway between Point Petro and Kankesanthurai. The first of these, which became the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), was conceived by two Velvettiturai youths, Nadaraja Thangavelu and his friend Selvaraja Yogachandran who were then living in Jaffna. By 1971 they were holding secret meetings at a professor's Point Petro home, collecting weapons and experimenting with bomb manufacture. Members of this loosely structured group gained considerable notoriety through unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Jaffna Mayor Duraiappah, a visiting government minister and a Tamil Congress member of Parliament. Yogachandran was arrested in 1973 when a police search discovered that his boat was loaded with dynamite. Ponnandi Sivakumaran, whom we encountered earlier as the first Tamil youth to die by biting a cyanide capsule, was also an early TELO member. While ineffective at first, TELO would later establish close ties with Tamil Nadu's movie actor turned Chief Minister, Mulhuvel Karunanidhi, and receive support from India's clandestine services organization, RAW.

The second militant group with Velvettiturai roots, first called the "Tamil New Tigers" and after 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was founded by another early TELO member, Velupillai Prabakharan. Since Prabakharan later become a major protagonist in Sri Lanka's protracted Tamil-Sinhalese civil war a brief recounting of his early life, primarily as told by Indian Journalist Narayan Swamy, is in order.

His father, Tiruventkatam Velupillai, was employed by Sri Lanka's government as a district land officer. His upbringing has been described as "typical middle class." Tiruventkatam was no militant, but his home and homes of his friends were venues for endless political discussions of the Tamil community's worsening position under the United Front. Young Prabakharan is described as listening quietly by his father's side at these gatherings.

Even in his mid teen years, Prabakharan is remembered as having set his sights on becoming a militant leader who would free the Tamil people from Sinhalese domination. Subash Chandra Bose, the Bengali nationalist who rejected Gandhi's pacifism and formed an "Indian National Army" to fight the British, became a role model. Bose's slogan, "I shall fight for the freedom of my land until I shed the last drop of blood" inspired the young man. America's "tough guy" movie actor, Clint Eastwood and Veerapandia Kattabomman, the legendary warrior featured in a popular Tamil movie, were also personal heroes. Prabakharan studied Napoleon's campaigns and, for lighter reading, "devoured" Phantom comic books. While other boys played sports, the future guerilla leader practiced shooting squirrels, birds and chameleons with his home made catapult and learned the rudiments of martial arts. Later, an air gun replaced the catapult and he recruited friends to practice making bombs, using chemicals stolen from their high school chemistry laboratory. Teasing family members nicknamed him veeravan, the brave one.

Personal bravery was important to Prabakharan. His commitment to a protracted armed struggle was more serious than many of his TELO compatriots and he had begun to discipline himself for what lay ahead. To practice withstanding torture, he would lie on bags in which hot chillies had been stored or remain tied in a bag under the hot sun in Jaffna's 100 plus degree heat for a full day. He stuck pins under his nails to practice withstanding pain and pricked insects to death with needles so that he would be mentally prepared to torture "the enemy." Before leaving Velvettiturai in the early 1970s, to become a full time militant, Prabakharan went through his home and destroyed every family picture in which he appeared. From that time on, he lived constantly under cover and rarely slept in the same place twice. On two occasions he fled across the Palk straits and hid out in Madras to escape police capture.

Despite these exploits, Prabakharan did not emerge as a leading guerilla figure until his successful assassination of Mayor Duraiappah on July 27, 1975. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was not formally established until after the March 1976 Puttur Bank robbery. Prabakharan personally chose the new organization's symbol which featured the head of a roaring tiger and crossed rifles. Robbery proceeds provided funds for establishing self sustaining training farms in the Vavuniya and Mullativu jungles, South of Jaffna, where carefully selected recruits were indoctrinated and drilled in marksmanship. Even with these resources, total LTTE membership was less than 100 at the time of the 1977 general election.

The most visible Tamil militant group formed during Sirimavo Bandaranaike's term was founded not in Sri Lanka, but at the London home of long-time Tamil student activist, Eliyathambi Ratnasabapathy. The Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), as the group named itself, was founded in 1975. They organized demonstrations in London and at the World Cup Cricket matches in Manchester that gave Tamil separatism its first international visibility. EROS established ties between Tamil separatism and Yassir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, when the PLO Ambassador, after attending a Tamil student meeting where he met Ratnasabapathy, offered to train Tamil guerrillas at Fatah camps in Lebanon. Three EROS members completed a six month training course in 1976 and an additional seven took the course a year later. Ratnasabapathy also agreed to include Tamil Tigers in the training program, but these plans became a casualty of factional disagreements between the two groups. EROS did not gain significant support in Sri Lanka until after 1977 when it began building strength among Tamil youths living primarily in Batticaloa District.

Tamil militant groups would not become a serious threat to Sri Lanka's government until the 1983 ethnic riots drove thousands of youths into their ranks. However the parallel growth of TELO, LTTE, EROS and PLOTE, along with less well known groups, established a pattern that continued into the 1980s. Published lists of militant groups typically included a dozen entries or more. This differed greatly from People's Liberation Front (JVP) domination of Sinhalese militancy both at the time of the 1970 insurrection and in the 1980s. Anthropologist Michael Roberts argues that multiple competing groups made Tamil militancy more resilient. Different groups tapped different regions, castes and social strata for recruits. The police's task of controlling militancy was more complex than if actions had been orchestrated by a central command.

Competition between groups for support also tended to push all of them toward more extreme positions. Groups proposing compromise or opposing violence risked being branded as "traitors to the Tamil nation." Militant groups became increasingly militaristic and coupled with police repression, this gave Tamil political life a more authoritarian caste. Loyalty to "the leader" was paramount and dissenting views were not tolerated. Open discussion of political issues necessary for a democracy to function became less and less possible. With the death of S.L.V. Chelvanayakam in 1977, the last influential Tamil leader committed to non-violence passed from the scene.

The Mainstream Tamil Political Parties

Chelvanayakam's deputy and successor, Appapillai Amirthalingam, was a less principled man. His professed commitment to non-violence included tacit acceptance of bombings and assassinations. Occasionally he used militant cadres as enforcers. When Amirthalingam was named leader of the opposition in Sri Lanka's Parliament, it appeared that he was at the height of his power, but this was an illusion. The era when Vellala Tamil politicians could speak of independence in Jaffna, while negotiating deals with Sinhalese politicians in Colombo was ending. Power to direct political life in the North was passing to the militant leaders.

In 1970, it was not inevitable that extremists would come to dominate a society that, despite political reverses, was still politically conservative and relatively peaceful. When Sirimavo Bandaranaike became Prime Minister, Chelvanayakam still believed that accommodation between Tamil and Sinhalese communities in a united Sri Lanka was possible. Switzerland was the Federal Party's model for power sharing, hardly a radical stance. Its 1970 election manifesto urged Tamils "not to lend their support to any political movement that advocates the bifurcation of the country." In 1971, Sri Lankan Government leaders viewed Jaffna as a safe location for incarcerating People's Liberation Front (JVP) leader Rohana Wijeweera and his top lieutenants.

Earlier in this chapter, we saw how Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government enacted policies, viewed as humiliating by many Tamils. These policies unintentionally targeted Tamil community members most likely to respond militantly. Policies discriminating against Tamil youth were intended to appease Sinhalese youth, a volatile population that government leaders feared more, but this evoked no sympathy from idealistic young men such as Eliyathambi Ratnasabapathy, Ponnundari Sivakumaren and Velupillai Prabakharan. For them, every new enactment and humiliation was viewed not only as Sinhalese oppression, but political failure of mainstream Tamil politicians.

This combination of government intransigence and rising youth militancy placed Chelvanayakam and his moderate colleagues in an impossible position. Beginning with the 1971 Constituent Assembly boycott, their actions and declarations sent increasingly strong messages to the Prime Minister about opposition to government policies in the Tamil community. Among the most important, as we have seen, were formation of the Tamil United Front, formal rejection of the Republican Constitution, the proposed "six point plan" for partial autonomy, Chelvanayakam's resignation from his Parliamentary seat, and finally, the Vaddukoddai resolution. By staking out more and more militant positions themselves, Tamil politicians were responding to pressures from their own community to move beyond "business as usual" politics. Public demonstrations, hartals and Chelvanayakam's overwhelming victory in the long delayed Kankesanthurai by-election provided solid evidence of Tamil community opposition to policies equating "national values" and "Sinhalese values" in a region than was more than 90 per-cent Tamil. Bombings and assassinations showed the direction Tamil resistance might take if non violent expressions of opposition continued to be ignored. We have seen, however, that by 1975, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government was both weakened politically and preoccupied with other matters. Like Chelvanayakam, the Prime Minister faced conflicting pressures. Demands from Tamil leaders, coupled with threats to government authority evoked counter-pressures from more militant elements among her own supporters who felt that "teaching those Tamils a lesson" was the appropriate response to demands for greater autonomy.

Although this was not known at the time, July 21, 1977 was the last time Tamils living in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces would have an opportunity to express the political goals of their community in a relatively free election. In their election manifesto, Tamil United Front presented the election as a referendum on whether the Tamil people endorsed an independent Eelam. Winning TULF candidates, the Manifesto stated, will "form themselves into the National Assembly of Tamil Eelam which will draft a constitution for the state of Tamil Eelam and establish the independence of Tamil Eelam by bringing that constitution into operation, either by peaceful means or by direct action or struggle."

Whether or not Tamil United Liberation Front leaders received their "mandate" is open to interpretation. In the Northern Province, TULF candidates won every seat and a large majority of the popular vote. In the Eastern Province, view by Tamils viewed as an integral part of their "traditional homeland," the UNP was the clear victor, by a margin of 8 seats to 4 and a popular vote plurality. This highlighted a problem rarely addressed by TULF orators in Jaffna audiences, but with serious practical implications for Sri Lanka's new leader of the opposition, Appapillai Amirthalingam. Whether or not the Eastern Province belonged to the "traditional Tamil homelands" could be debated by historians, but its inclusion in an independent Tamil state was an economic and political necessity. This meant Tamil Eelam would have its own minority problem. A majority of the Eastern Province's population were either Sinhalese or Muslim, had voted for UNP and wanted to remain in Sri Lanka.

Amirthalingam also faced a second problem. Northern Province voters at least had given him a clear mandate to lead them to an independent Tamil Eelam, but it soon became apparent that he had no strategy for attaining this goal. By speaking of a "secret plan" for independence he raised Tamil expectations and Sinhalese fears, but his real objective seems to have been no different than Chelvanayakam - some kind of compromise settlement with the newly installed UNP government. As leader of the opposition, Amirthalingam was unable to deliver either an independent Eelam or a compromise that would grant Tamils limited autonomy. This failure disillusioned many Tamils who had been strong TULF supporters. It eroded their already fragile faith in democracy and made them more receptive to militant appeals. As Amirthalingam showed his true colors, many young Tamils who had welcomed the TULF victory came to view him as a traitor to their cause.

The Indian Tamils

Both in economic position and political power, Indian Tamil plantation workers remained at the bottom of Sri Lankan society throughout Sirimavo Bandaranaike's years in office. We have seen that they experienced severe discrimination at the hands of Agriculture Minister Hector Kobbekaduwa and some other Sinhalese officials. However successive agreements resolving the statelessness problem were adding Indian Tamils to Sri Lanka's voting rolls. By the next general election it was possible that in some districts they might be represented in Parliament by members of their own community rather than by Buddhist Sinhalese nationalists who opposed their interests. Thus, Indian Tamil leaders hoped voting power could be added to the very limited arsenal of weapons at their disposal to bring pressure on plantation owners and Sinhalese politicians. Since even a fully enfranchised Indian Tamil community would always be a small minority, gaining political power meant choosing political allies. Choosing how to relate to the increasingly militant Tamil parties of the North posed a severe challenge.

Economic deprivation and exploitation rather than lack of political freedom were Indian Tamils' most pressing problem. They had the highest infant mortality, highest illiteracy and lowest life expectancy in Sri Lanka. Working conditions were poor and wages were low. Conditions faced by women were particularly harsh. Often they had to walk long distances to work and then spend 12 hours picking tea. They had to pick a certain volume of tea to earn their wages, but if they met their quota early, they were required to continue picking. Latrine facilities and drinking water were limited. Supervisors could discipline workers, without recourse, for minor infractions.

With more than 300,000 members Savumiamoorthy Thondaman's Ceylon Worker's Congress continued to be the most powerful Indian Tamil labor organization. However his power was lessened by Sri Lanka's custom of having multiple competing unions, many affiliated with political parties, in the same industry. Twelve Unions competed for plantation workers' allegiances and four of those were government allies. Pressed by foreign exchange shortages and with a five year plan emphasizing industrial development, high income from tea plantations was far more important to United Front leaders than Indian Tamils' well being. Thus in labor negotiations, government affiliated unions generally placed political loyalty above the need of workers they were supposed to represent. They opposed demands by CWC lead unions for higher wages and better working conditions. When independent union members walked off the job to support their demands, these actions were also opposed by the government unions.

As the most influential Indian Tamil leader, Thondaman pursued a dual strategy of negotiating with more sympathetic government ministers and attempting to build independent political strength. The first track, which involved a combination of demands, threats, short work stoppages and compromises, achieved only limited concessions from a government in increasingly straitened circumstances and with a strong anti-Tamil bias. The political track, however, was to prove more successful in the long run.

Initially, as we have seen, Thondaman responded to anti-Tamil provisions of the Republican Constitution by joining with the Federal Party and Tamil Congress to form the Tamil United Front. The "six point plan," agreed to at Trincomalee in 1972, demanded rights for all Tamils living in Sri Lanka, and had his full endorsement. For a period of time, the collaboration was close. Ceylon Workers' Congress members supported the civil disobedience campaign of October 1972 and worked for the Tamil United Front candidate in the 1974 Mannar by-election. Meetings of the TUF Executive Committee were chaired by the three party leaders, Ponnambalam, Chelvanayakam and Thondaman in rotation. As Northern leaders responded to militant pressure by moving toward separatism, however, Thondaman began to develop an alliance with the United National Party. Ceylon Workers' Congress cadres supported the UNP civil disobedience campaigns against government economic policies, turning out in large numbers for the Nuwara Eliya satyagraha in the heart of the tea country. Thondaman strengthened personal ties with a surprised and pleased J.R. Jayewardene when he evaded Sirimavo Bandaranaike's police cordons and joined the UNP leader for the demonstration at Attanagalla Temple. "You're a great man! " Jayewardene is reported to have said at the time. Thondaman also campaigned for Jayewardene in Colombo when he resigned and then ran for reelection to protest the government's extension of its term in office.

Formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front and passage of the resolution advocating an independent Tamil Eelam widened the gap between Thondaman and northern leaders. He formally dissociated the Ceylon Workers' Congress from the resolution. Indian Tamils, all comparatively recent migrants to Sri Lanka had no historical links, real or imagined, to the "traditional Tamil homelands." It was clear to the politically astute Thondaman that his followers had nothing to gain and much to lose from calls for an independent Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern regions.

A secret meeting called by Thondaman at his apartment, across the street from Colombo's hallowed Royal College, further strengthened ties with Jayewardene. A small number of top United National Party and Tamil United Front leaders gathered to hear a plea by Thondaman for cooperation in a campaign to defeat Sirimavo Bandaranaike's reelection bid. Responding, the TULF leaders stated they were prepared to support Jayewardene "in your effort to save democracy" and would make no specific demands. Jayewardene responded that he would address what were identified as the principal Tamil grievances - use of the Tamil Language, "colonization" of Tamil lands, discrimination in employment and citizenship for the remaining Indian Tamils who were still stateless. We shall see in Chapter 11 that the alliance between Jayewardene and the TULF leaders was short lived. However Jayewardene's alliance with the Ceylon Workers' Congress was long lasting. In 1977, Savumiamoorthy Thondaman was elected to Parliament, representing Nuwara Eliya-Maskeila constituency. This was part of the old Nuwara Eliya constituency that he had represented in 1947, before the Indian Tamils lost their citizenship. In 1978, J.R. Jayewardene, now Sri Lanka's Executive President under a newly ratified constitution, asked Thondaman to become a member of his cabinet. He remained an influential cabinet minister throughout Jayewardene's term in office and during the terms of the two UNP Presidents that succeeded him.