Endnotes
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1. See Rothchild and Hartzell (1988).
2. For example, see Kodikara (1989).
3. See for example Grims and Satriano (1990).
4. The collection is found in George Mason University's Fenwick Library.
5. DWIL provides simultaneous computerized searches of the following indices: Humanities Index, from February, 1984; Social Sciences Index, from February 1983; General Science Index, from May 1984; Business Periodicals Index, from July 1982; Readers' Guide, from January 1983; Index to Legal Periodicals from August, 1981.
6. The keyword search described above certainly did not identify all relevant works dealing with the resolution of ethnic conflict. However we believe it does accurately portray the relatively modest level of attention given to ethic conflicts by scholars who are more generally concerned with conflict resolution. Whether or not lessons drawn from resolving other types of conflict are relevant to resolving ethnic conflicts will be examined more fully later in this paper.
7. Major leadership in initiating studies of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution is being provided by the grants program of the U.S. Institute of Peace (1990).United States Institute of Peace, Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking: A Summary of Completed Grant Projects (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, December, 1990).
8. Most notable among these is the work of the Harvard Negotiation Project, directed by Roger Fisher and William Ury. See, for example, Fisher and Ury (1981), and Fisher, et. al. (1989). Problem-solving approaches are discussed below.
9. The fact that Mao sometimes used repression to deal with ethnic diversity in China does not detract from the usefulness of his insights.
10. For example, see Azar et. al., 1984; Azar and Haddad (1986).
11. For a discussion of antecedents to the "forum" approach, see Mitchell (1981). This type of third party mediation is discussed more fully below.
12. See also Francis Mading Deng, "Negotiating Identity: Dishonored Agreements in the Sudanese Conflict," in this volume.
13. As its title, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies suggests, de Silva's work focuses primarily on conflict management rather than conflict resolution. Thus it is similar in approach to the works of Horowitz (1985) and Nordlinger (1972) discussed below.
14. For example, by creating reserved offices for particular ethnic groups.
15. For example, by establishing electoral procedures that encourage coalition formation involving more than one ethnic group.
16. Proportional allocation was the basis of Lebanese political stability for a number of years and was a feature of the London-Zurich agreement. Various proportional allocation schemes have been proposed as conflict regulation mechanisms in Sri Lanka. Nordlinger's earlier work, discussed immediately below, views preferential policies more favorably.
17. Protagonist group leaders agree not to involve the government in public policy areas that impinge upon group members' core values and interests.
18. Lickleider selected his cases from the Singer-Small (1982) data on large scale conflicts that had ended "at least for some considerable time." The cases he examined were Sudan - 1972, the American Civil War, Colombia - 1957, Zimbabwe, Yemen, Greece and Nigeria. Only the Sudan, Nigeria and, perhaps, Zimbabwe could properly be termed ethnic conflicts.
19. Both studies include, but do not specifically focus on ethnic conflicts.
20. The ignorance of third party intervenors (Rajiv Gandhi in both cases) seems to have been an important factor in the failure of the Indo-Lanka and Punjab accords. In the case of the London-Zurich accord, third party intervenors simply imposed a solution from above.
21. The four cases are the Moroccan-Algerian boundary conflict, the Somali-Ethiopian clash, the territorial struggle between Zaire, Zambia and Angola and the efforts to bring Namibia to independence. Interestingly, the author gives the U.S. relatively high marks as a mediator. Its representatives, he observes, seemed more genuinely interested in resolving the conflicts than in seeing one side win.
22. In competitive negotiations, there are clear winners and losers. The goal is to win. In problem solving negotiations, the goal is to transform the context of the conflict so that both protagonists can emerge as "winners."
23. One reason for the attention given to Getting to Yes was news accounts describing the use of Fisher and Ury's "principled negotiation" method in the process that lead to the Camp David Peace Accords. However Touval, in a work discussed below (1982), argues that the principal reasons for the success of President Carter's intervention were the large amounts of aid promised to Egypt and Israel and internal changes in each nation that occurred prior to the negotiations. The our view of the role that principled negotiation played in the accords is discussed below.
24. Linda Singer's Settling Disputes: Conflict Resolution in Business, Families and the Legal System (1990) is a more recent work focusing on the growing use of collaborative problem solving approaches to dispute resolution in the United States.
25. The literature reviewed in this paper does not lend itself to neat categories, and some experts in the field may feel uncomfortable with the categorizations we have made. For example, we have chosen to omit Paul Pillar's thoughtful Negotiating Peace (1983) because few of the conflicts it examines are ethnic conflicts. Kressel and Pruitt (1989) and Berkovitch (1984) have been discussed above, rather than in this section, because their emphasis seems more theoretical than practical.
26. As of December 25, 1991, known officially as the "former Soviet Union."
27. The authors offer a useful example from the Camp David Agreements to illustrate this point. Israel wanted to retain control over the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula because they feared a military threat. Egypt insisted on regaining sovereignty over the Peninsula. The interests were reconciled by returning the Sinai to complete Egyptian sovereignty, but demilitarizing large areas.
28. Other principles or criteria listed by the authors include: "precedent", "costs", "what a court would decide", "moral standards", "tradition, equal treatment", and "reciprocity".
29. As noted above, later use of this approach by Azar and others to mediate conflicts in Lebanon, Falklands-Malvinas and Sri Lanka produced useful, but inconclusive results (Azar, 1991).
30. Touval and Zartman's edited volume, International Negotiation in Theory and Practice (1985) might also be included here. However most of the cases discussed that volume do not seem relevant to violent ethnic conflict.
31. As part of the study, a questionnaire was administered to senior negotiators from both the American diplomatic services and to diplomats holding key negotiating positions in other nations. The theme of the questionnaire was "what do you know now that you wish you had known when you first started?"(p. 7). Fifty United Nations ambassadors and high members of the U.N. Secretariat participated in a second set of interviews which involved participants in a simulated negotiating experience.
32. For example Zartman and Berman offer the following four guidelines for the "detail phase" of negotiations (pp. 201,202): (1) Do not lose the big picture in the little picture. (2) Be clear from the beginning about objectives, and do not confuse means with ends. (3) Steadiness at the brink requires a clear understanding of increments and a sense of both sides' ability to do without an agreement. (4) Concessions are made to convey a message but they are justified by a principle.
33. The mediators discussed in individual chapters of Touval's book are Count Bernadotte, Ralph Bunche, The United Nations Conciliation Commission, The Robert Anderson Mission, The Gunnar Jarring Mission, The William Rogers Initiative and Interim Agreement Talks, the initiative by African presidents, Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," U.S. President Carter's mediation leading to the Camp David Accord.
34. In Sri Lanka, for example, LTTE leader Vellipillai Prabakharan has systematically exterminated the leaders other Tamil groups, both moderate and militant.
35. Horowitz points out however that the level at which these animosities are expressed can change, over time and be influenced by changes in constitutional and political arrangements (1985, Ch. 3, 15).
36. One factor contributing to the duration of many ethnic conflicts has been the availability of external support from contending superpowers or regional hegemons. With the end of the cold war and breakup of the former Soviet Union, this source of support is diminishing somewhat. On the other hand, international drug dealing seems to be a growing source of funds and armaments for militant groups (and perhaps for some governments as well).
37. Among six ethnic conflicts found among Paul Pillar's terminated wars, for the post World War II period (1983, pp. 21-23), four ended with the capitulation and/or decisive military defeat of one protagonist. One (Cyprus) ended with the enforced separation of the contending groups. In one (Sri Lanka) both class and ethnic conflict rekindled after an initial defeat of one militant group by government forces. As noted above violent conflict is still prevalent in four of the six cases described in this book. In Cyprus stability is enforced by UN peacekeepers and Turkish forces. Other examples of protracted ethnic conflicts not resolved by negotiation include Eritria-Ethiopia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Burma. The Ethiopian-Eritrian civil war of more than twenty years ended in 1991 with the military defeat of the Ethiopian army and toppling of the Mengistu regime.
38. "Civilian casualties" and "human rights violations" had been one justification for the Indian intervention. However when the Indians decided to force the Tigers from Jaffna, they used a full-scale armored assault, supported by aircraft and artillery. There were many civilian casualties. As the Indian Peace Keeping force became transformed from liberator to foreign army of occupation, complaints of human rights violations were just as numerous as those that had been leveled against the - largely Sinhalese - Sri Lankan army.
39. Unfortunately even the peace established by this "successful" accord proved to be unsustainable. The Addis accord lacked institutional mechanisms to bridge the differences between North and South and depended too much on the personal support of one man, the President. Those factors proved to be its undoing.
40. Judging whether an accord could have been crafted to meet the multiple, conflicting demands that surfaced in the Meech Lake ratification process is beyond the scope of this paper.
41. This is a summary of major points found in Touval (1982), Chapter 11.
42. The accords were negotiated between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter serving as mediator. The most detailed description of the negotiations is found in Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (1986), by former National Security Staff member William B. Quandt. President Carter provides a more personal account in his autobiography, Keeping Faith (1982).
43. The negotiations failed to produce a meaningful agreement for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, however.
44. Quandt (1986) is pessimistic about the degree to which the lessons of Camp David can be applied to other negotiations.
45. The role of regional groups as mediators is addressed in Wolfers (1985) and Scheman and Ford (1985).